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Abstract* 
 
Recent legislative reforms of law of succession in Spain affecting both the Spanish Civil Code (mainly from 
2003) and the six civil laws of the Autonomous Communities (including changes in 2006-2007 in Galician 
law) give rise to a  need to revaluate and reassess some of its central features. This reassessment should, 
consider not only  changes arising from legislative intervention, but also from case law and everyday 
practice, as these reveal new trends in a number of areas including the legal position of widows and 
widowers, the rights of unmarried couples when one of them deceases (with very different approaches 
depending on the Spanish regions), the impact of marital crises on succession, the formal requirements of 
wills, the validity of inheritance agreements, estate planning, substitutes for testaments, succession of 
family businesses and enterprises, and the scope of a testator’s freedom of disposition and the role of the 
forced share (on which there is an intense debate).  
 
This study explains these developments taking into account those three sources (legislation, case law and 
practice) and provides both an up-to-date summary of the existing legal framework and some reflections on 
the future based on recent proposals for further reform suggested by scholars and notaries. Finally, the 
experience of the Spanish jurisdiction, which comprises seven different laws of succession within one legal 
system, also allows observations to be made as the role of comparative law in legal development and the 
possibilities of harmonising law of succession in the European Union. 
 
Keywords: Testament; Wills; Inheritance Agreements; Forced Heirship/Share; European Law of Succession; Estate 
Planning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
* This paper was drafted and presented as the Spanish National Report for the XVIIth Congress of the International 
Academy of Comparative Law, held in Utrecht, The Netherlands, 16-22 July 2006 (section II.A, Succession Law, 
General Reporter, S. VAN ERP). It follows to some extent the structure established for the session on that Congress 
and has been revised and updated until July 2007 for this publication. 
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1. Introduction  
 
This presentation will be divided into three parts: the part (I) will examine the general trends 
regarding recent changes, focusing particularly on not just the latest legal reforms but also 
changes arising from case law and the spontaneous practice; the part (II) will be focused on the 
influences of these changes on any comparative legal analysis and includes an examination of 
recent proposals for changes to law of succession presented by the Spanish “Association of 
Professors of Civil Law” at its monographic session held in February 2006 and by other entities; 
and part (III) will examine the impact of (regional) economic integration and offers some final 
reflections on the distinction between certain areas in which supranational harmonisation of Law 
of Succession may be more feasible than in others. 
 
As a general prior framework to make it easier to understand the latest modifications to Law of 
Succession, it is worthwhile highlighting some genuine features of Spanish Law in this area: the 
existence of seven Law of Succession systems in Spain and the fact that Spain is one of the 
countries where wills are used most.  
 
1.1. Seven Law of Succession systems in Spain 
 
It is important to remember that Spain has seven Law of Succession systems with fairly different 
characteristics and institutions in many aspects. Thus, the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, book III 
title III of which contains the 331 articles on succession mortis causa (articles 657-1087 Cc), is 
accompanied by the specific civil regulations of six Autonomous Communities with powers to 
“conserve, modify and develop” their Civil Law within the limits established by the Spanish 
Constitution (article 149.1.8 of the Constitution). As a result, following the latest reforms, there 
are now different regulations governing the succession of the de cuius in Aragon (1999), the 
Balearic Islands (1990), the Basque Country (1992 and 1999), Catalonia (1991), Galicia (2006) and 
Navarre (1973)1. In the overall structure of these “Autonomous Community civil laws” or 
“Derechos forales”, Law of Succession normally accounts for the largest proportion of rules in such 
systems. Thus, in Navarre one third of the region’s Civil Law is Law of Succession (197 of 596 
rules); in Aragon it accounted for half (70 articles out of 153) of the Aragonese Civil Compilation 
of 1967, reformed in 1985 and currently it is contained an independent Law of Succession, dating 
from 1999, with 221 articles; in the Balearic Islands, which have two different bodies of laws, one 
body for Mallorca and Menorca and another for Ibiza and Formentera, it represents 85% (62 of 85 
articles) of their genuine Civil Law; in the Basque Country, which also has three bodies of 
                                                 
1 In Aragon, Succession Law was formerly within the Law 15/1967, of April 8 (Compilation of Aragonese Civil 
Laws) as amended by the Law 3/1985, now in the Law 1/1999, of February 24 on mortis causa successions. In the 
Balearic Islands, in the Legislative Decree 79/1990, of September 6 (which consolidates the text of the Law 
5/1961). In the Basque Country, formerly in the Laws of  July 30 1959 and Law 6/1988, now in the Law 3/1992, of 
July 1, on the Civil Regional (Foral) Law of the Basque Country, plus the Law of the Fuero of Guipúzcoa, of 
December 30 1999. In Catalonia, formerly in the Law 40/1960, repealed by the Law 13/1984, of  March 20, now in 
the Law 40/1991, of December 30, of the Code of successions by cause of death in the Civil Catalan Law. In 
Galicia, in the Law 2/2006, of June 14, on the Civil Law of Galicia (that has repealed the Law 4/1995, of  May 24, 
which substituted the Law 147/1963 [third additional disposition of the Law 2/2006, dealing with rights of stable 
couples, modified by Law 10/2007, of June 28, see infra]) on the Civil Law of Galicia. In Navarre, Law 1/1973, of 
March 1, on the Compilation of the Civil Foral Law of Navarre (modified by Law 5/1987). 
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regulations for different areas, more than half are articles concerning Law of Succession (77 out of 
147 articles plus 47 new articles for the area of Guipúzcoa); in Galicia, more than one third of its 
Civil Law is Law of Succession (127 of 308); in Catalonia, where civil legislation has developed 
enormously in other areas, there is a Succession Code for mortis causa successions introduced in 
1991 with 396 articles that are currently being reviewed within the scope of the Catalan Civil 
Code.  
 
There are clear regulatory differences in terms of the legislative methods used and their content, 
ranging from complete codes or special laws on succession (in Catalonia and Aragón for 
example) and more or less detailed regulations within the Civil Law or Autonomous Community 
Civil Law or Compilation in question. The rules governing succession in the Civil Code – applied 
directly in the other 11 Autonomous Communities, as well as Ceuta and Melilla – complement 
legislation in these six Spanish regions, which sometimes avail from these regulations for specific 
topics, whereas the Spanish Civil Code is hardly applied there in many other topics. Regarding 
their content, the Autonomous Community civil law systems enjoy greater formal freedom 
(because they allow instruments prohibited under the Civil Code, such as inheritance 
agreements, joint wills, certain fiduciary schemes, etc.) and greater material freedom (differing 
enormously from system to system, and ranging from absolute material freedom in Navarre and 
in the Fuero de Ayala [Ayala Laws] in one part of the Basque Country, where testators are allowed 
not to leave anything to their children, to little material freedom in other parts such as the Fuero 
de Vizcaya [Vizcaya Laws] in another part of the Basque Country where testators are obliged to 
leave four-fifths of their inheritance to their children). The seven succession systems in Spain are 
coordinated by the same rules of conflict of laws governing international successions. The key 
factor is not nationality but “legal residence” (vecindad civil), determined on the basis of filiation, 
marriage or time of continuous residence in a given territory (article 14 Cc). According to article 
9.8 of the Spanish Civil Code, “succession mortis causa shall be governed by the National Law of 
the deceased at the time of his or her death, regardless of the nature of the properties and country 
where they are located”2. 
 
Three conclusions may be drawn from this brief summary. Firstly, Spanish Law as a whole is a 
wonderful breeding ground for internal comparative law. In addition to looking at other 
international legislation, attention to reforms introduced in other Autonomous Community civil 
law systems and general case law of the Spanish Supreme Court has played an important role in 
the reforms of each law of succession system; however, this comparison has not yet reaped all the 
potential dividends and is very minimal when compared with the changes made to the Civil 
Code (with some exceptions, such as article 831, amended by Law 41/2003, and its inspiration on 
Navarran-Aragonese law; vid. infra). Secondly, although the Civil Code has been partially 
reformed on different occasions pursuant to succession regulations, many of its key features 
correspond to regulations introduced in the nineteenth century. In contrast, various regional laws 
have undergone global reforms updating their content, although more far-reaching reforms are 
required to adapt their provisions to reflect the changes in social conceptions of property and 
                                                 
2 Article 9.8 Cc continues to deal with the problem of changes of nationality (or of vecindad civil, legal residence) 
between the moment a will is made and the moment of the death.  
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family since they were adopted. The differences are evident if we keep in mind that the Civil 
Code was passed in 1889 and the Autonomous Community Civil Laws were passed between 
1959 and 1973, and some of these are even in their “second generation” (even a “third 
generation”, as the recent case of Galicia in 2006), with special succession laws or codes having 
been introduced since 1991. Thirdly, given the enormous plurality of Spanish legislation and the 
scope of this field of law3, this presentation will tend to focus on the reforms introduced in the 
field of “common Civil Law” (i.e., the Spanish Civil Code), although it will also examine the 
changes to Autonomous Community civil laws whenever the trends are worth highlighting. 
  
1.2. Spain is one of the countries where wills are used most 
 
Recent studies reveal one differential feature, namely that Spain is one of the countries in which 
wills are used most. Different statistics seem to suggest that almost half of inheritances may be 
ordered by the deceased (through a will or inheritance contract, in the provincial territories 
where this is permitted); in comparative terms, it has been affirmed that this represents a unique 
phenomenon in the world and that Spain may undoubtedly be the European country where wills 
are used most frequently4. Wills are used for very different reasons, and their use is increasing: 
apart from a historical tradition dating back to the Late Middle Ages – when drafting a will was 
considered a moral and a religious duty–, people have placed great faith in wills executed before 
notaries, and which are very safe, efficient and cheap (costing around 40 euros)5; in contrast with 
the probate of Common Law, notarial wills do not need to be judicially certified or proven to be 
effective6. Moreover, this use of wills infers a clear desire to avoid the legal distribution of 
intestate inheritances and to alter as far as possible the system of forced shares or legítimas 
established by law in favour of descendants, ascendants and spouse; in fact, as will be explained 
later, there is a clear tendency to strengthen the rights of the surviving spouse through 
testamentary provisions (or also through other channels inter vivos enforceable post mortem, the 
                                                 
3 For an overview on the Spanish system, J. D. GONZÁLEZ CAMPOS and A. BORRÁS (2002), “Spain”, in D. HAYTON 
(ed.), European Succession Laws, 2nd ed., Jordans, Bristol, p. 431 ff. 
 
4 J. DELGADO ECHEVERRÍA (2006), “Una propuesta de política del Derecho en materia de sucesiones por causa de 
muerte. Segunda parte: objetivos de una reforma del derecho de sucesiones”, in Derecho de sucesiones. Presente y 
Futuro. XII Jornadas de la Asociación de Profesores de Derecho Civil [“XII Jornadas APDC”, Santander, 9-11 February 
2006], Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Murcia, Murcia, § 9, pp. 103-115. According to this author’s 
conclusions –determined by the difficulties of obtaining reliable data and figures in Spain on this topic, which he 
tries to offer–, this trend is even increasing: wills are used much more today in Spain than 20 years ago (58% 
more, increasing 370,161 notarial wills in 1984 to 584,848 in 2002, for example). The proportion of 50% of wills 
regulated by will contrasts with the figures for Italy (around 15%), Belgium (between 10 and 15%), France (10%), 
Germany (20%) or England (33%): see A. ZOPPINI (2002), Le successioni in diritto comparato, in Trattato di diritto 
comparato diretto da Rodolfo Sacco, UTET, Torino, pp. 125-126. 
 
5 DELGADO ECHEVERRÍA, ibidem, § 9.7, p. 115 (“the cheapest in Europe”). 
 
6 A. SERRANO DE NICOLÁS (2005), “Estate planning: la planificación de la herencia al margen del testamento (will 
substitutes), in M. GARRIDO MELERO and J. M. FUGARDO ESTIVILL, El patrimonio familiar, profesional y empresarial. Sus 
protocolos, Bosch, Barcelona, III, pp. 496 and 503-504 (with figures on the almost non-existing litigation against 
notarial wills). 
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so-called “will substitutes”, “estate planning” and the use of other mechanisms), and whose 
position, within the comparative context, is extremely weak in the Spanish Civil Code7. 
 
 
2. General trends regarding recent changes in Spanish Law of Succession 
 
2.1. Changes originated from legislative reforms 
 
a. Reforms in the Civil Code 
 
Since the Civil Code was enacted, just over one quarter of its original articles have been amended 
(around 90 of 331 articles) through fifteen legal reforms. Of these laws, the most numerous and 
significant from the standpoint of trends in legislative policy have been introduced in the last 25 
years8, following the important Law 11/1981, of 13 May (which amended around 45 articles) on 
filiation, parental authority and the economic regime of marriage. This Law sought to adapt the 
Civil Code to the new premises of equality established by the Spanish Constitution of 1978, not 
just within the scope of Family Law, but also in the area of Law of Succession. Bearing in mind 
the purpose of this law, the reform also provided for the recognition of equivalence of all children 
(in marriage, outside marriage and adopted) and enabled a number of other extremely important 
amendments such as the priority of spouses over collateral relatives in intestate successions 
(spouses came to occupy third place in this ranking after the descendants and ascendants). It also 
authorised the payment of the forced share (legítima) in money and not in property in certain 
special cases (articles 841-847 Cc) and reformed regulations governing preterition or wrongful 
omission (article 814 Cc, still the subject of controversy, gave rise to an unfinished debate on the 
possibility of applying the right of representation, inherent in the intestate succession, to 
testamentary successions). Surviving spouses were also empowered to distribute part of the 
estate of the deceased (the mejora - part of the estate that may be used to benefit any or some of 
the [descendants] forced heirs more than the others) to the descendants (article 831). However, 
apart from the 1981 reform and the reform introduced by Law 30/1991, of 20 December, on 
certain formal aspects of notarial wills, the most significant changes in terms of legislative policy have 
taken place in the last three years, in the form of four legislative amendments, which we shall now 
examine in greater detail.  
 
                                                 
7 S. CÁMARA LAPUENTE (2003), “¿Derecho europeo de sucesiones? Un apunte”, in S. CÁMARA LAPUENTE (ed.), 
Derecho privado europeo, Colex, Madrid, p. 1201. 
 
8 Until 1981, only four Laws had been enacted to amend the Civil Code in this area: the Law of 21st July 1904 
(holograph will is valid on any kind of paper), the Royal Decree-Law of 13th January 1928 (intestate succession 
only to the fourth degree of kinship, and not to the sixth degree), the Law of 24th April 1958 (changes on the legal 
position of the surviving spouse and valid succession contracts in favour of adopted children). After 1981, the 
following reforms were made: Law of 13th May 1981 (see text), the Law of 7th July 1981 (minor change to 
provisions on disinheritance), the Law of 31st March 1984, the Law of 15th October 1990 (non-discrimination for 
reasons of gender, indignity and disinheritance), the Law of 20th December 1991 (form of testaments, see text), the 
Organic Law of 15th October 1996 (consistence of certain articles and protection of minor children), the Law of 7th 
January 2000 (time of death of people disappearing at sea, in wars and natural disasters), plus the four Laws of 
2003 and 2005 mentioned in the text. 
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1) In 2003, Law 7/2003, of 1 April (published in the BOE, Spanish Official State Gazette, on 
2.4.2005) on “New Limited Liability Partnerships Law”, took advantage of a reform of 
Company Law to introduce three modifications in the Civil Code (articles 1056, 1271 and 1406) 
in order to facilitate business succession. Specifically, according to article 1056.2, testators who, 
in order to preserve the company or, in the interests of their families, wish to preserve an 
economic activity undivided or maintain control over a corporation or group of companies, 
may decide to pay the forced share corresponding to the other interested parties in cash, even 
if this is not included in the estate. This liquid money may come from sources other than the 
estate itself and its payment may be deferred – in contrast to the general rule that 
encumbrances, deadlines or payment conditions cannot be imposed with respect to the forced 
share (article 813.2 Cc) – for up to five years following the testator’s death. If the form of 
payment was not established, the forced heir may demand his or her forced share of goods 
from the estate. This reform aims to make the succession system sufficiently flexible to prevent 
companies or family businesses from being divided as a consequence of the effects of the 
legítima (forced heirship). In practice, other mechanisms inter vivos are being used to elude this 
undesired effect. The scope of the conditions established in the new article 1056 has given rise 
to a dispute on its purpose, creating a division between those who consider that the rule 
should be strictly interpreted and those who defend a broad interpretation, so that (i) 
strangers (non-relatives) may also inherit the company and pay money to the testator’s 
children, and that (ii) simple holding companies and not just companies sensu stricto may 
benefit from this form of privileged succession with respect to the general rules established in 
the Code9.  
 
2) In 2003, coinciding with the International Year of Disabled People, Law 41/2003, of 18 
November (BOE, 19.11.2003), governing the protection of assets of disabled persons, directly 
modified three areas of the Civil Code (unworthiness to inherit, forced share and collation) to 
provide better protection for disabled people. The definition of disabled persons is not 
uniform because in the case of certain rights they must be judicially declared as disabled 
(articles 808, 813 and 782: forced share), whereas this requirement does not exist with respect 
to other rights (article 822: inhabitation right; 756.7 and 1041: unworthiness and collation). The 
reform also introduces significant amendments to one general article applicable to any person, 
although the stated purpose indicates that the aim of this institution is to provide “indirect 
protection for disabled people’s assets”: article 831 Cc allows the testator to confer to his or her 
spouse or to the other parent of their common children (not necessarily partner in a registered 
couple) broad powers to improve and distribute the estate of the predeceased among the 
                                                 
9 In favour of the narrow construction, M. ESPEJO LERDO DE TEJADA (2006), “La reforma del Código civil por la Ley 
de la Sociedad Limitada de la Nueva Empresa”, in J. M. ABRIL CAMPOY AND M. E. AMAT LLARI (eds.), Libro 
Homenaje al Prof. Luis Puig Ferriol, Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia, I, pp. 1263-1266. In favour of a broad interpretation, 
F. MILLÁN SALAS (2003), “La partición hecha por el testador al amparo del nuevo artículo 1056.2 del Código civil”, 
Actualidad Civil, 4, pp. 1181-1183; V. M. GARRIDO DE PALMA (2005), “Capitulaciones. Régimen matrimonial. 
Sucesión mortis causa y estatutos sociales. Armonización con el protocolo familiar”, in GARRIDO/FUGARDO, El 
patrimonio familiar..., [supra, fn. 6], IV, p. 646; V. M. GARRIDO DE PALMA (2005), “Los actuales artículos 831 y 1056.2 
del Código civil. Aplicaciones prácticas ante el sistema de legítimas”, Revista Jurídica del Notariado, 55, pp. 133-134. 
However, with hesitation and some replies, L. RUEDA ESTEBAN (2005),  “La modificación del párrafo segundo del 
artículo 1056 del Código civil”, in GARRIDO/FUGARDO, El patrimonio familiar..., (supra, fn. 6), IV, p. 215 and 218-221. 
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common children or descendants. This copies the provisions already established in various 
Autonomous Community civil laws10, by allowing distribution of the estate to be deferred 
substantially after the testator’s death in order to verify the real qualities and needs of each 
potential heir, and strengthens the position of the surviving spouse or de facto partner of the 
deceased. This fiducia sucesoria (a sort of mortis causa trust) was already envisaged in the Civil 
Code, but its scope has now been broadened in terms of subjects and purpose and the 
applicable legal regime is explained in greater detail. 
 
The mechanisms directly reformed to protect disabled people in Law 41/2003 include, most 
notably, two completely new developments in the Spanish legal system that, in addition to 
their specific purpose, may entail a reconsideration of the existing secular dogmas 
underpinning Law of Succession in the Spanish Civil Code. Firstly, the possibility of 
encumbering the entire forced share of the other forced heirs with a fideicommissary substitution 
in favour of the children or descendants declared incompetent by a Court (articles 782 and 808 
Cc)11. This creates an exception, for the first time, regarding the firm principle that no 
“encumbrance, or condition, or substitution of any kind” may be imposed on a forced share 
(article 808 Cc: qualitative intangibility of the forced share). Secondly, it establishes a new right 
to inhabit the habitual residence in favour of disabled forced heirs (article 822 cc)12, which may be 
established voluntarily (by donation or legacy) and which, on a privileged basis, shall not be 
included for calculating the forced share, or shall be legally established in favour of the 
disabled forced heir under the double requirement of the disability and the prior living 
together with the deceased. This allocation of the inhabitation right ex lege represents a sort of 
“legal legacy”, a category that had already disappeared from the Civil Code.  
 
3) In 2005, Law 13/2005, of 1 July (BOE, 2.7.2005), which amended the Civil Code in matters 
relating to the right to marry, despite not expressly modifying any provision in the Civil Code 
on Law of Succession, by introducing the right to marry a person of the same sex, automatically 
grants the surviving spouse in a homosexual marriage exactly the same rights as those 
                                                 
10 An overview of the fiduciary instruments in the Succession Laws of the Autonomous Communities, in C. ASÚA 
GONZÁLEZ (1992), Designación de sucesor a través de tercero, Tecnos, Madrid; S. CÁMARA LAPUENTE (1996), La fiducia 
sucesoria secreta, Dykinson, Madrid, p. 13 ff.; S. CÁMARA LAPUENTE (2001), “Comentario a las leyes 281-288 del 
Fuero Nuevo de Navarra”, in ALBALADEJO/DÍAZ ALABART (eds.), Comentarios al Código civil y Compilaciones forales, 
Edersa, Madrid, XXXVII.2, p. 323 ff.; J. L. MERINO HERNÁNDEZ (1994), La fiducia sucesoria en Aragón, El Justicia de 
Aragón, Zaragoza. On the new art. 831 Cc, A. RODRÍGUEZ YNIESTO (2005), “La reforma del artículo 831 del Código 
Civil por Ley 41/2003: la delegación de la facultad de mejorar”, Revista Jurídica del Notariado, 55, p. 169 ff.; L. 
RUEDA ESTEBAN (2005), “La fiducia sucesoria del artículo 831 del Código civil”, in GARRIDO/FUGARDO, El 
patrimonio familiar..., [supra, fn. 6], IV, p. 155 ff. 
 
11 On this, S. DÍAZ ALABART (2004), “La sustitución fideicomisaria sobre el tercio de legítima estricta a favor del 
hijo o descendiente incapacitado judicialmente”, Revista de Derecho privado, p. 259 ff.; S. DÍAZ ALABART (2006), “El 
discapacitado y la tangibilidad de la legítima: fideicomiso, exención de colación y derecho de habitación”, 
Aranzadi Civil, 3, pp. 15-37; M. ESPEJO LERDO DE TEJADA (2005), “El gravamen de la legítima en el Código Civil: 
situación tras la reforma del mismo por la Ley de Protección Patrimonial de las Personas con Discapacidad”, 
Revista Jurídica del Notariado, 53, p. 113 ff.; L. F. RAGEL SÁNCHEZ (1995), “La sustitución fideicomisaria sobre la 
legítima estricta”, in ABRIL/AMAT (eds.), Libro Homenaje al Prof. Luis Puig Ferriol, cit. [supra fn 9], II, p. 1995 ff. 
 
12 J. FLORES RODRÍGUEZ (2005), “El nuevo artículo 822 del Código civil: el derecho de habitación sobre la vivienda 
habitual como fórmula de tutela sucesoria preventiva en beneficio del discapacitado”, Revista Jurídica del 
Notariado, 54, p. 37 ff. 
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bestowed upon a widowed spouse in a heterosexual marriage. With this reform, the on-going 
debate regarding succession rights of unmarried couples –whose situation is not governed by 
specific law at state law although laws have been introduced in this regard in different 
Autonomous Communities–, and, in particular, the succession rights of homosexual de facto 
couples, must necessarily amend its bases, premises and conclusions. 
 
4) Another 2005 reform of Family Law affecting Law of Succession, although this time certain 
articles on succession mortis causa were specifically changed. Law 15/2005, of 9 July (BOE, 
9.7.2005), on the reform of the Civil Code in matters relating to separation and divorce, 
changed the wording of five provisions governing the rights of surviving spouses13, and 
which doctrine had already been challenging for various reasons: (i) its incoherence (articles 
834 and 945) because spouses may have rights to forced share in some cases when they lose 
their intestate rights due to marital crises, sometimes giving rise to relatively unfair situations; 
(ii) its evident incorrectness since the question of “fault” in separation or divorce proceedings 
was suppressed after the Code was reformed by Law 11/1981, and although this Law did 
modify other provisions in this area (including article 945 on situations in which separated but 
not divorced spouses are entitled to the intestate succession of their deceased spouses), it 
forgot to change the mention of separation for reasons “attributable to the deceased” as 
grounds for maintenance of his or her forced share in article 834 Cc; and finally, (iii) the 
unconstitutional nature of the provisions extending the rights of surviving spouses was 
reproved in cases when the deceased had illegitimate children during marriage.  
 
Following these criticisms, the legislator introduced the following reforms: firstly, an 
harmonization of the situations in which the succession rights of spouses disappeared in 
marital crises, imposing the same criteria with respect to their forced share rights and their 
intestate inheritance rights: they would only hold such rights if “they are not separated legally 
or de facto when their partner dies” (articles 834 and 945). Secondly, the suppression of the rule 
whereby if the couple was separated following a judicial lawsuit, they would have to wait 
until the result of the litigation to decide whether or not to keep their succession rights (article 
835); this was the object of much controversy in case law given the extremely personal  nature 
of separation and divorce proceedings14. Thirdly, based on the principle of non-
discrimination, the legislator suppressed the two exceptional situations in which rights of the 
surviving spouses were increased if competing in the succession proceedings with children 
belonging only to the their spouse who were conceived during their marriage. Consequently, 
this law suppressed article 837.2, whereby they such persons were entitled to the usufruct of 
half of the estate instead of their generic right to the usufruct of one third of the inheritance 
when competing with any children (as it is the current situation). The law also modifies the 
provision establishing the surviving spouse’s right to ask for his or her usufruct to be 
                                                 
13 See C. LÓPEZ BELTRÁN DE HEREDIA (2005), “Breve comentario sobre la modificación de los preceptos sucesorios 
operada por la Ley 15/2005, de 8 de julio”, Revista Jurídica del Notariado, 56, pp. 23-28; M A. FERNÁNDEZ 
GONZÁLEZ-REGUERAL (2006), Los derechos sucesorios del cónyuge viudo en la nulidad, la separación y el divorcio, 
Dykinson, Madrid. 
 
14 Art. 81 Cc. Ad ex., challenging the rule of article 835 Cc, SCJ (Supreme Court Judgment) of May 26 1982 and SCJ 
of February 27 1999. This question has not been uniformly solved in case law. 
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transformed into money or into property; previously this could only be requested when 
competing with illegitimate children, but is now possible when competing with any children 
only of the deceased (article 840). 
 
b. Reforms in special Laws outside the Civil Code 
 
A number of recent reforms introduced outside the scope of the Civil Code have affected the 
inheritance phenomenon, because they affect the persons entitled to the inheritance, the object of 
the estate itself and its exceptional distribution in accordance with criteria other than the general 
criteria established in the Code. In the first case, mention must be made of Law 14/2006 of 26th 
May on assisted human reproduction techniques (which repeals Law 35/1988, of 22 November and 
its 2003 reform); article 9.2 of this Law allows husbands who give their consent, in a special 
document, a public deed, a will or a post mortem instructions document, for their reproductive 
material to be used for a period of twelve months after their death to fertilize their spouses, with 
the legal effects of marital filiation. This right is also granted to unmarried males. Although this 
article does not clarify whether future embryos must, from a legal standpoint, be treated in the 
same way as the nasciturus (article 29 Cc) and must therefore be considered to have been 
conceived at the time of the testator’s death, this is the most tenable interpretation15. This has 
been expressly established in the civil laws of Catalonia (article 10.3 of the Catalan Succession 
Code of 1991) and Aragon (article 10 of its Succession Law of 1999). 
 
In terms of the special objective situations of inheritance, we must start by indicating that the new 
Insolvency Law (Act 22/2003, of July 9, Ley Concursal, LC) consolidates the rules applicable to 
certain situations in which Succession Law and Insolvency Law converge16. It specifically 
establishes the system for declaring bankruptcy of the “lying” or “recumbent inheritance” 
(hereditas iacens) (people with legitimation, administration, prelation, etc.), which only takes place 
when the estate” is accepted on a benefit of inventory basis and not when it is accepted purely 
and simply (article 1.2 LC). It also establishes the consequences of the death of an individual who 
was declared bankrupt (article 182 LC). These rules are complemented by those established in the 
Civil Proceedings Law of 2000, which, based on trends in case law, established the procedural 
system governing hereditas iacens (open succession but not yet accepted by those called as heirs: 
articles 6.1.4º, 7.5 and 798); this last Law allowed for this estate still without a holder to be the 
plaintiff and defendant in procedures in which it was involved; it also established a new system 
for the legal administration and division of estates (articles 782-805). 
 
                                                 
15 M. A. MARTÍNEZ GARCÍA (2005), “Las disposiciones patrimoniales y las personas físicas no nacidas: el nasciturus, 
el concepturus y los bienes a ellos destinados”, in GARRRIDO/FUGARDO, El patrimonio familiar... [supra, fn. 6], II, pp. 
45-46. 
 
16 See J. BOLÁS ALFONSO (2005), “El concurso del causante, de la herencia y del heredero”, in Estudios sobre la Ley 
concursal: libro homenaje a Manuel Olivencia, Marcial Pons, Madrid, II, p. 1879 ff.; C. M. DÍEZ SOTO (2006), “La 
herencia en la nueva Ley Concursal”, in ABRIL/AMAT (eds.), Libro Homenaje al Prof. Luis Puig Ferriol, cit. [supra, fn. 
9], I, p. 1097 ff.; M. ESPEJO LERDO DE TEJADA (2005), “Presupuestos dogmático-sucesorios del concurso de la 
herencia: una aproximación civilística a la Ley Concursal”, in Estudios sobre la Ley Concursal..., p. 1909 ff. 
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There are other “special successions” outside the Civil Code that, due to their specific purposes, 
have their own rules that introduce exceptions to the ordinary succession system under the Civil 
Code. The recent evolution of these regulations also reveals new trends. Firstly, the Urban 
Leasing Law of 1994 allows (article 16) certain relatives or persons related to the deceased lessee 
(spouse, heterosexual or homosexual person living with the deceased lessee for at least the last 
two years, descendants, ascendants, brothers and sisters or disabled relatives living with the 
person for the same period) to be subrogated under a property lease17. Secondly, as established in the 
new paragraph e) of article 24 of the Rural Leasing Law, according to the wording of the Law of 7 
December 2005, such leases may be terminated in the event of “death of the lessee, preserving the 
rights of the person’s legitimate heirs. In such circumstances, and unless expressly stipulated by 
the testator, preference shall be given to persons who are young farmers”. Therefore, the 
legislator of 2005 removed this right from ordinary successions to protect young farmers in 
particular who may be subrogated in rural leases. Thirdly, in the case of administrative concessions or 
professional activities requiring certain licences (chemists, lottery outlets, tobacconists, etc.), the 
Administrative Law imposes special requirements on the heirs of such legal relationships or new 
authorisations for the continuation of such licenses by the person designated by the testator. The 
matter of whether these rights form part of the holder’s estate or not has been the object of 
contradictory decisions in more recent case law, hence future legislative clarification is 
required18. 
 
c. Reforms in the Autonomous Community civil laws  
 
Apart from the in-depth revisions of various Autonomous Community civil laws or 
Compilations in the area of Law of Succession (e.g. in Navarre in 1987, Catalonia in 1991 or 
Aragon in 1999, Galicia in 2006)19, it is worthwhile mentioning - given the national trends they 
may establish, which will be studied in the next section – the reforms introduced to modify the 
succession rights of widowed spouses or to acknowledge new legal benefits mortis causa 
attributable to certain individuals who are emotionally related to, or lived with, the testator.  
 
One such law is the new Law 2/2003, of February 12, which establishes the economic marital and 
widowhood regimes of Aragon. This law amended the Aragonese Law of 1999 on successions 
mortis causa to solve a series of problems arising from the peculiar system in force in Aragon, and 
unique within Spain, whereby the spouse acquires, by virtue of marriage and not by death of his 
or her partner, the widow’s usufruct on all his or her partner’s property, hence it is normally 
considered to have two phases: an expectant phase (which has been reformed most) and another, 
after one of the spouses has died, when this universal usufruct is irrevocably acquired.  
                                                 
17Article 33 of the Urban Leasing Law permits the subrogation in rental contracts of premises where a 
professional business is held only to heirs or legatees of the dead contractor who continue the activity. 
 
18 K. J. ALBIEZ DOHRMANN (2005), “Disposiciones patrimoniales en vida para después de la muerte”, in 
GARRIDO/FUGARDO, El patrimonio familiar..., cit. [supra, fn. 6], II, pp. 594-596; A. DOMÍNGUEZ LUELMO (2005), “Dos 
casos de sucesión mortis causa excepcional: las administraciones de lotería y las expendedurías de tabaco”, in T. F. 
TORRES GARCÍA (ed.), Estudios de Derecho civil homenaje al prof. Francisco Javier Serrano García, Universidad de 
Valladolid, Valladolid, p. 193 ff. 
 
19 See information on those Laws and their amendments in footnote 1. 
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A paradigm of the recognition of succession rights in favour of people other than relatives or 
quasi-matrimonial living partners, are two Catalan laws with no equivalent regulation in the rest 
of Spain. These are Catalan Law 19/1998, of December 28, on situations of common residence 
and mutual support and Catalan Law 22/2000, of December 29, on private care of elderly people. 
Under the first law, the relations of two or more persons living together in the same residence 
and who, without forming a family nucleus, permanently share and help to pay common costs 
and to perform domestic chores, give rise, if one of the unit’s members dies, to benefits including 
a regular maintenance pension, if necessary, payable by one of the heirs to the survivor for a 
maximum period of three years. Under the second law introduced in 2000, an agreement to care 
for persons aged over 65 or disabled people, giving rise to a relationship of coexistence in the 
same habitual residence where the sheltered persons is treated in the same way as a relative by 
the care-giver in exchange for a given price. The contracting parties must not be second-degree 
blood relatives. Termination of the care agreement due to the death of one of the parties gives rise 
to different rights on the property, as well as the right of the care-giver to request from the cared 
person’s heirs an indemnity if there is a significant disproportion between the welfare and 
benefits received by the cared person and the compensation received inter vivos and mortis causa 
from the latter. Furthermore, and this is the most noteworthy aspect in the context of this study, 
Catalan Law 22/2000 only grants care-givers three types of succession rights: voluntary 
allocation mortis causa; one quarter of the value of the estate in any case; and summoning as 
abintestate heirs before the third-degree collateral relatives. The Catalan doctrine has criticised 
the unilateral nature of these succession rights and has proposed that cared persons should also 
have the same rights to the inheritance of the care-giver20. There is also some scepticism 
regarding the concession of succession rights between the care giver and the care receiver, as a 
formula for providing better support in old age. 
 
However, the most noteworthy trend within civil regulations in the Autonomous Communities 
with competence in this area is the concession of succession rights to heterosexual and homosexual de 
facto couples. In this area, there are clear contrasts with Spanish national legislation, which still 
does not regulate in general terms, either through an ad hoc law or in the Civil Code, the 
succession rights of these non-married couples living together. Nor has national case law 
extended the rights to forced share or to intestate succession of spouses by analogy to cohabiting 
couples. Therefore, this area reveals a clear difference in rights between regions governed by the 
Law of Succession of the Civil Code (where legally constituted unmarried couples do not have 
reciprocal succession rights21 and where only spouses in different sex or same sex marriages have 
these rights) and the regions that have passed laws on unmarried couples (13 of 17 Autonomous 
                                                 
20 In this sense, for futher reference, see M. C. GETE-ALONSO, M. YSÀS SOLANES, S. NAVAS NAVARRO, J. SOLÉ RESINA, 
“Sucesión por causa de muerte y relaciones de convivencia”, in Derecho de sucesiones. Presente y Futuro. XII 
Jornadas de la Asociación..., [supra, fn. 4], § 4.6-8, pp. 362-375. 
 
21 And the constitution of a stable union or partnership may be subject to different requisites according to the 
different specific Laws on the topic; those Laws (see the next footnote) grant no right on the partner’s estate when 
they are enacted by Autonomous Communities where the Civil Code is in force and they have no competence on 
Civil Law. 
 13
InDret 4/2007 Sergio Cámara Lapuente 
Communities have done so)22 where, because of competence in this area, civil benefits mortis 
causa are bestowed on stable couples only in 6 regions (Aragon, the Balearic Islands, the Basque 
Country, Catalonia, Galicia and Navarre). 
 
Although it is particularly difficult to make a comparative synthesis of these six regimes without 
committing errors resulting from any simplification process, we can identify a series of features of 
the legal regulations governing unmarried couples in Autonomous Community Civil Laws (for a specific 
summary of the characteristics of each system, see Annex 1 to this study): 
 
1) There is no uniform notion of “unmarried couples” or “stable couples” in Spanish legislation since 
each law establishes differences in terms of both the requirements and forms of constitution 
of such couples. As regards the requirements, in addition to establishing similar but not 
identical impediments to the constitution of couples (previous marriage, kinship, etc.), some 
laws require partners to be of legal age, whereas under other laws it is sufficient for minors 
to be independent (vid. Annex 1). Regarding the ways of forming unmarried couples 
established by the Law, some Autonomous Communities require couples to register with a 
special Register before they can be treated as a legal couple (Aragon, Balearic Islands, Basque 
Country and Galicia [here, only after the amendment of the Law 2/2006 by the Law 10/2007 
of 28th of June]), whereas others offer alternative methods for people to form such couples, 
such as public documents (Catalonia and Navarre) or evidence of having lived together for 
an uninterrupted period (two years for heterosexual couples in Catalonia; one year in 
Navarre [it was also so in Galicia, before the amendment of the Law 2/2006 by the Law 
10/2007]); this period may be shorter if they have children in common. 
 
2) All the abovementioned Autonomous Community laws grant the same succession rights to 
homosexual and heterosexual couples, except Catalonia, which grants more legal succession rights 
to the surviving partner in homosexual couples living together. The reasons given for this 
lack of equivalence in the statement of purposes of Catalan Law 10/1998 is that while 
heterosexual de facto couples decide not to marry for personal reasons, homosexual couples 
cannot do so. Evidently, after the state reform of marriage by Law 13/2005, this reason, 
which had already been criticised before, has disappeared. Therefore, in the future Catalan 
law must be reformed to ensure equivalent treatment of succession rights for homosexual 
and heterosexual couples, although it is not yet known whether this recognition of 
equivalence will grant more rights (with succession rights, as is currently the case for same-
sex couples) or fewer rights (without succession rights, as it is currently the case for 
different-sex couples). 
                                                 
22 In chronological order: Law 10/1998, of July 15 (Catalonia); Law 6/1999, of March 26 (Aragon); Law 6/2000, of  
July 3 (Navarre); Law 1/2001, of December 19 (Valencia); Law 18/2001, of December 19 (Balearic Islands); Law 
11/2001, of December 19 (Madrid); Law 4/2002, of  May 23 (Asturias); Law 5/2002, of  December 16 (Andalusia); 
Law 5/2003, of March 6 (Canary Islands; Law 5/2003, of  March 20 (Extremadura); Law 2/2003, of  May 7 
(Basque Country); Law 1/2005, of  May 16 (Cantabria). Not by a special Law, but by a single article (Third 
Additional Disposition) in the Law 2/2006 of June 14, on the Civil Law of Galicia, this region has granted also 
mortis causa rights to stable unmarried couples (exactly the same rights granted to married persons); this Galician 
norm has been modified (as for the requisites to constitute a stable couple, without changes on the effects of this 
relationship) by Law 10/2007, of June 28. 
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3) Legislation governing unmarried couples grants two blocks of rights: authentic rights in mortis 
causa succession of the predeceased established by mandatory Law (forced share, although its 
qualification as such in these cases is debatable, and rights in intestate successions) or 
permitted by law if the testator wishes to grant or agree such rights (voluntary usufruct on 
the entire estate, whenever permitted). These laws recognise other civil non-succession rights, 
namely family, maintenance or compensation rights, albeit linked to the death of one of the 
partners in couples living together23. In general, they are direct rights of the living partner 
based on economic need or dependency or on the emotional value of certain items of 
property, which are not treated as part of the inheritance but as separate items: the right to 
live for a given period in the common residence of the deceased, the right to be subrogated 
in the lease on the residence, the right to the “household furnishings” (clothing and furniture 
in the common residence and other movable items of little value, provided that they are not 
jewels, artistic objects, items of extraordinary value or, in some cases, family objects). 
 
4) Spanish legislation adopts two approaches when it comes to recognising rights to the 
inheritance of deceased living partners: some laws envisage full equivalence in succession with 
the spouse in a marriage (Balearic Islands, Basque Country, Galicia, Navarre), whereas other 
laws opt not to grant this person succession rights in the strict sense of the term, although they 
do grant some other advantages under Public, Family or Support Law (namely in Aragon 
and, as regards heterosexual unmarried couples, Catalonia). Given this second alternative, 
doctrine is divided between the school of thought that considers this lack of full recognition 
of equivalence with the rights attributed to married couples to be a reactionary approach24, 
and those who feel this decision stems from greater regulatory freedom for those who do not 
want to marry and, therefore, represents a more modern and liberal view of the function of 
Law of Succession. Nevertheless, legislation claiming to endorse the recognition of 
equivalence with marriage with respect to the forced share, intestate succession and the 
possibilities of voluntary succession, also contain certain imbalances between both legal 
realities: sometimes because they do not grant surviving partners certain non-succession 
civil rights that are granted to spouses (preferential allocation of the habitual residence to 
spouses as part of their share of inheritances in Navarre; family movable property in 
Catalonia) or, inversely, because they grant such rights to living partners and not to spouses 
(household furniture and use of the common residence for one year in the Basque Country). 
On other occasions, succession rights granted to unmarried couples are simply different to 
those attributed to partners in married couples (for example, the rights of homosexual living 
partners in intestate successions in Catalonia are different in terms of preference with respect 
to those of a spouse). 
 
                                                 
23 For a good overview on both types of rights in the Civil Autonomic Laws, see GETE-
ALONSO/YSÀS/NAVAS/SOLÉ, “Sucesión por causa de muerte...” [supra, fn. 20]. 
 
24 For instance, as regards Aragón, see MERINO HERNÁNDEZ, J. L., in ALBALADEJO / DÍAZ ALABART (eds.), 
Comentarios al Código civil y a las compilaciones forales, Edersa, Madrid, 2000, XXXIII, 1, p. 655 ff. 
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5) Regarding other rights not strictly relating to succession but dependent on the death of the partner, 
legislation tends to expressly establish parallel rights to those granted to spouses. However, 
it does not use simple remissions. Instead, it attempts to preserve the conceptual distinction 
between both concepts, without merging all the rights because this would render the 
dichotomy ineffective. Thus, some laws recognise an individual’s right to continue living for 
one year at the common residence that belonged to the deceased (Aragon, Basque Country, 
Catalonia), most allow living partners to take away from the estate clothing, furniture and 
items of little value (“removal right" or derecho de predetracción), Catalonia allows only 
heterosexual living partners in need to receive maintenance under the estate for one year, 
and some refer to the subrogation of survivors under leases contracted by deceased partners 
(Catalonia, the Balearic Islands). As explained above, this right has already been recognised 
in all Spain for all unmarried couples under the Urban Leasing Law (supra, 1.1.2), hence 
problems of competence may arise because the requirements in terms of the definition of 
unmarried couples are different in national leasing law and autonomous laws governing 
unmarried couples. 
 
6) The other Autonomous Community laws on unmarried couples without jurisdiction in civil 
matters (seven laws) do not contain any Law of Succession rule for such situations. They 
simply treat the rights of de facto couples in the same way as the rights of married couples, 
according to their regulatory powers under Public Law25. 
 
2.2. Legislative trends 
 
Judging from the reforms described above and some other less recent reforms, attention should 
be drawn to a series of more technical amendments and other modifications prompted by changes 
in legislative policy. Among the former and in addition to those relating to estate in bankruptcy 
or insolvency situations (Law 22/2003) and to the elimination of contradictions in certain 
provisions governing the legal succession rights of spouses in the event of marital separation or 
divorce (Law 15/2005), the following may be highlighted: first, the way in which abintestate heirs 
are declared was changed following the reform of the former Civil Proceedings Law (1881) by Law 
10/1992, of 30 April; thereafter, abintestate heirs could not only be declared by judicial means 
(this is now reserved for collateral relatives and the State) but also by Notary when the heirs were 
the descendants, ascendants or spouse; the proposed “Law of Voluntary Jurisdiction”, pending 
approval, will consolidate and apparently update this regime26. Secondly, the time when person 
disappearing in shipwrecks or accidents are legally certified as deceased was modified by Law 4/2000, of 
7 January; articles 193-194 of the Civil Code were changed to reduce the deadlines for declaring 
deaths, based on practical experience in recent times (from years to months). Thirdly, Law 
30/1991, of 20 December, modified various articles of the Civil Code on the formalities of wills 
                                                 
25 The only minor exception is Andalusian Law 5/2002, which envisages a non-successory right of living in the 
current dwelling for one year. 
 
26 Currently, the applicable rules are articles 979 and 980 of the Law of Civil Procedure of 1861, which are 
transitory in force by virtue of the new Law of Civil Procedure of 2000, until a new Law of Voluntary Jurisdiction 
is enacted (now in phase of blueprint). 
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executed before Notaries: the technical reforms included the confirmation of people’s identities from 
their DNIs (Spanish National Identity Cards), the adaptation of wills concluded under transitory 
capacity to legal reforms on disqualification, the viability of mechanical means for “closed wills”, 
the elimination of the need for witnesses to guarantee greater intimacy or the use by the testator 
of the different languages used in Spain that the Notary does not understand. Fourthly, certain 
reforms on succession rights were also introduced by Organic Law 1/1996, of 15 January, on the 
legal protection of minors; according to the statement of purpose of this law, the aim was to 
“resolve grammatical and content mismatches caused by successive partial reforms of the Code”. 
 
Regarding the reforms revealing trends of genuine legislative policy, it is worth mentioning the 
following, albeit accepting that most do not fully develop the underlying concept but simply 
represent timid or partial attempts at developing social-political currents that will probably give 
rise to further changes in the future. 
 
a. Strengthen the legal position of surviving spouses under the law  
 
Until now, this extremely strong guideline in testamentary practice (vid. infra, I.2) has had limited 
expression in the Civil Code, in contrast to clear provision in this regard in other laws. The last 
Civil Code reform giving preference to spouses over collateral relatives was introduced in 1981 
(whereby spouses inherit in intestate successions with priority to collateral relatives, and after 
descendants and ascendants). The forced share to which spouses are entitled, only in one share 
(not in the entire inheritance as is the case under various Autonomous Community civil laws) 
and only in usufruct, and not in property, has not been changed since 1958. The only recent 
modification to the Civil Code, geared to strengthening the spouse’s position with respect to the 
family, was made to article 831 Cc by Law 41/2003, as mentioned previously (supra, I.1.1.1.b); 
thus, if the spouse is empowered by the deceased to distribute the items in the estate left by the 
latter among the common descendants, respecting the minimum forced shares and other 
bequests of the testator, his/her family authority will also have been ratified since he/she will 
have decision power over the family estate. This fiduciary figure also exists, with its own features 
and established by secular practice, in various Autonomous Community civil law systems.  
 
However, the rights of surviving spouses have been strengthened within common state law, as 
mentioned previously, mainly through different laws that establish special succession rights on 
certain property items or rights and thus give preference to the spouse over all the deceased’s 
relatives: this is the case with the Urban Leasing Law of 1994 (article 16), the Rural Leasing Law 
of 2003 (article 24), different indemnities awarded under compulsory travel insurance coverage, 
death in road accidents or when the deceased is a victim of violent or terrorist crimes27. 
Nevertheless, in terms of strict legal rights (forced share and intestate succession) to an 
individual’s ordinary inheritance, Autonomous Community civil law systems have clearly gone 
beyond the Civil Code in terms of providing protection for surviving spouses (vid. infra, table as 
Annex 2, comparison of forced shares in Spain’s seven civil law systems). 
                                                 
27 In this respect, for further reference, see M. MARTÍNEZ MARTÍNEZ (2006), “La reforma de la sucesión intestada en 
el Código civil”, in Derecho de sucesiones. XII Jornadas..., [supra, fn. 4], pp. 438-441. 
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In future legislative policy decisions concerning the rights of surviving spouses, at least two 
factors deriving from the latest legal reforms must be taken into account: firstly, the fact that in 
almost all the reforms spouses have been designated as the main obligors of certain types of care 
or duties with respect to their husbands/wifes, with preference over other relatives (as 
guardians, providing maintenance, administering common property, etc.); and secondly, if the 
pressure to improve spouses’ rights was a priority when marriage was indissoluble (until 1981 in 
Spain) or when there were important temporary and causal obstacles to obtaining divorce (until 
2005), the current situation in which marriages may be terminated almost immediately by one of 
the spouses (since the introduction of Law 15/2005), the system should at least be reviewed. The 
need does not seem to have disappeared, but the grounds of law have changed. According to 
doctrine, one school of thought strongly supports greater freedom to testate, particularly with 
respect to descendants and ascendants, in order to give testators more scope to freely dispose in 
favour of their spouses, whenever this is the testator’s wish. In any case, formal disinheritance of 
spouses under current Spanish legislation is still limited largely to fixed and exceptional causes, 
but it is very simple to eliminate any expectations a spouse may have of receiving an estate by 
obtaining the dissolution of the marriage relationship28. 
 
b. Special protection for certain collectives 
 
The reason for this trend can be traced to at least three grounds. Firstly, from an objective 
standpoint, and in order to strengthen the undivided transmission of certain sources of wealth, the 
legislator has introduced certain mechanisms governing succession in family businesses (article 
1056 Cc., in 2003, vid. supra I.1.1.a) or in farming businesses (article 24 of the Rural Leasing Law of 
2005; inheritance agreements were accepted for that purpose in 1981, but this option was 
abolished in 1995). Secondly, from a subjective standpoint, the Civil Code has been modified to 
protect collectives in weaker or more defenceless positions, such as disabled people (Law 
41/2003), minors (Organic Law 1/1996, modifying article 1057 on certain formalities regarding 
partition when minors or persons under guardianship or conservatorship) or nascituri conceived 
by means of assisted reproduction (provided for in Aragon and Catalonia, not expressly in the 
Civil Code). Thirdly, and also from a subjective perspective, some of the most important reforms 
of late seek, for reasons of opportunity or due to social pressure, to grant ex novo or strengthen 
the rights of persons with greater emotional ties to the de cuius: thus, apart from the limited 
recognition of new rights or powers for spouses, we may highlight, within the scope of the Civil 
Code, the new rights granted to spouses of the same sex, and within the scope of Autonomous 
Community civil laws, the legal succession rights of unmarried couples. 
 
c. Granting legal succession rights to homosexual and heterosexual unmarried couples: various 
contradictory legislative policies 
 
In Spain the legal reaction to this phenomenon has not been uniform, but it even reflects different 
contradictory approaches. As we have seen (I.1.1.3), six Autonomous Communities have 
                                                 
28 DELGADO ECHEVERRÍA, op. cit., § 10.2, p. 120. 
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established specific rules to regulate this phenomenon; of these six, four (Galicia, Navarre, the 
Balearic Islands and the Basque Country) grant similar rights to de facto couples as those enjoyed 
by married couples, one (Catalonia) grants succession rights to homosexual couples but not to 
heterosexual couples and one (Aragon) does not grant any testamentary rights to any unmarried 
couples. In the rest of Spain, the Civil Code has not been modified to extend testamentary rights 
to unmarried couples, which means these couples have no right ex lege. Nor has any specific law 
been announced in this area, such as the one proposed by the current Government when it was in 
the opposition during the previous legislature. It is clear that since 2005 the debate on this issue 
has changed radically following the admission of marriage for all persons, even those of the same 
sex who wish to marry, and the elimination of obstacles to divorce (so much so that another 
characteristic differentiating married and de facto couples has been suppressed, namely the 
requirements for dissolution). In any case, the Autonomous Community civil law model 
concerning the rights of stable couples has, so far, prioritised the recognition of equivalent rights 
and benefits to those enjoyed by married couples, but it has failed to take into consideration 
various “disadvantageous” aspects of this recognition of equivalence (presumptions of fraud, 
compulsory duty to reserve family goods received by the surviving spouse or testamentary 
conditions on not marrying), which should be taken into account in a future state law29. 
 
d. Modifying the grounds for disinheritance and unworthiness to inherit in order to adapt 
them to new social conceptions 
 
This has been limited and fragmented in time and has only taken place in response to relatively 
evident situations. Thus, with the decriminalisation of adultery, this was suppressed as a ground 
for not being entitled to inherit from the injured party (Law 22/1978); the reform of marital crises 
situations reviewed the grounds for disinheriting spouses (Law 20/1981); the latest penal reforms 
and practical experience established that the abandonment, prostitution or corruption of children, 
not just daughters, are grounds for unworthiness to succeed (Law 11/1990); and the Law 
protecting the estate of disabled people established new and extensive grounds ruling that 
persons not providing appropriate care to disabled people are unworthy to succeed (Law 
41/2003). 
 
e. Applying the constitutional principles of non-discrimination for reasons of gender or 
equality of all children before the law 
 
Although the main impetus to adapt the Civil Code to these key directives came from the Law of 
13 May 1981, attempts have recently been made to eliminate discrimination that still existed in 
the succession mortis causa of people with children conceived in adultery during marriage 
(articles 837 and 840 Cc., vid. supra). However, it is worth noting that equal testamentary 
treatment between children conceived in marriage, children conceived outside marriage and 
adopted children, achieved by virtue of the 1978 Constitution and implemented in the Civil Code 
by the abovementioned Law 11/1981, is only fully enforceable in relation to successions initiated 
                                                 
29 M. CUENA CASAS (2005), “Uniones de hecho y abuso del derecho. Acerca de la discriminación en contra del 
matrimonio”, La Ley, nº 6210, March 15, § III. 
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after the Constitution. In other words, based on a Supreme Court’s decision, and for reasons of 
legal certainty, if the father of children born outside marriage, or “illegitimate” children, died 
before the Constitution was approved, these children were not be entitled to the succession mortis 
causa of their father, in accordance with legislation in force at the time of the latter’s death; 
however, they may take appropriate action to declare their filiation during their entire lives, 
although this will not have any successory consequences30. 
 
f. Should the formal requirements of wills be made more flexible? 
 
This idea has not been a priority for the legislator, although some small steps have been made in 
this regard particularly by suppressing witnesses who were necessary until the 1991 reform in 
the case of wills executed before notary. Thus, the legislator endorsed the general opinion of 
Notaries and testators that witnesses are not necessary for either probative or formal purposes31. 
This minimum flexibility has so far not been translated into an increase in legal instruments for 
disposition mortis causa, since the request of notaries, lawyers and private individuals to validate 
instruments other than individual wills, such as inheritance agreements or joint wills, is still not 
contemplated in the Civil Code. 
 
g. Minimum flexibilisation of the rigidity of material limits (forced share, reserves) at the free 
disposition of the testator 
 
There has been a timid trend in this direction within the scope of the Civil Code, starting in 1981 
with the possibility of awarding items in the estate to one child or descendant and paying the 
forced share to the others in the form of out-of-the-estate money (articles 841-847 Cc.), in contrast 
to the previous prevision whereby the forced share should be distributed in items from the estate. 
The regulations became more flexible in 2003 with the possibility of not just paying the forced 
share in money to any forced heirs specifically to maintain economic activities or businesses 
undivided (article 1057.2), but which even allows for such payments to be deferred for up to five 
years following the death of the testator. For now, it has also halted the serious undermining of 
another principle, namely the qualitative and quantitative intangibility of forced share (this may 
not be subjected to encumbrances or conditions or deadlines), with the 2003 reform that allows 
the entire forced share of descendants to be subject to a fideicommissary substitution in favour of 
the descendant disqualified as unable by a Court judgment (articles 808, 818 and 782 Cc.); thus, 
forced heirs who are fideicommissary substitutes will not receive anything until the disqualified 
fiduciary dies. As can be seen, all these modifications aim to soften the insurmountable 
restrictions imposed by the concept of forced share (legítima) on the free disposition of the 
testator, granting new possibilities for payment or allowing them to be used in favour of a 
specific group, but without directly tackling the challenge of suppressing or reducing forced 
shares. When examining legislation currently in force in certain Autonomous Communities 
                                                 
30 For instance, Spanish Supreme Court Judgments of March 17 1995, July 28 1995, October 15 1997 and, 
particularly, the one of March 17 2005. 
 
31 On this, see J. J. RIVAS MARTÍNEZ (1993), El testamento abierto otorgado ante Notario después de la Ley de 20 de 
diciembre de 1991, Dykinson, Madrid, p. 66 ff. 
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which have their own Civil Law systems (vid. Annex 2, infra), these contrasts enormously with 
the Civil Code since the forced share is lower in certain areas or even only formal, without any 
patrimonial content in others (in the Ayala Laws within one part of the Basque Country and in 
Navarre).  
 
h. Readapting legislation to new family situations and to the new legal bearings governing 
marital crises 
 
The legislative changes introduced to reflect new family trends are exemplified in the Civil Code 
through the admission of marriages between people of the same sex, in some Autonomous 
Community civil law systems through the recognition of rights of succession mortis causa of 
unmarried couples, and in Catalonia through the recognition of the effects of succession on new 
personal relations such as care for elderly or disabled people or non marital couples in which 
both members receive mutual assistance. The adaptation of regulations to the new legislation 
governing marital crises is manifested by the elimination of obligatory succession rights in the 
case of judicial or de facto separation and in the event of divorce. Some legal declaration should 
still have to be issued on the destination of voluntary dispositions established in wills in favour 
of the spouse at the time the will is executed and no longer at the time of death of the testator 
without revocation of the will (or if they are legally separated). While legislation in Aragon 
(article 123), Catalonia (article 132), Galicia (art. 208 of the Law 2/2006) and Navarre (law 201, 
only with respect to joint will provisions) establishes the presumption that such designations of 
heirs or legatees are deemed to be revoked, the question remains less clear within the scope of the 
Civil Code32. 
 
i. Future reforms? Two dynamic factors: family and estate 
 
Finally, more legislative reforms can be expected in the near future due largely to two 
transformations in existing regulations governing succession originating mainly from systems 
and situations dating from the 19th Century. Firstly, social changes in the core of traditional family 
structures have influenced parallel changes in the testamentary intentions of testators that 
represent a break with the past. These changes include most notably33: (i) the transformation 
from extended families to nuclear families and, in recent years, from nuclear families to new 
forms of coexistence based on affection and individualism (compared with the collective systems 
                                                 
32 See RDGRN (Resolution of the Directorate General of Registries and Notary’s Offices) of November 26 1998 
and some recent judgments of different Courts of Appeal. In doctrine, A. VAQUER ALOY (2003), “Testamento, 
disposiciones a favor del cónyuge y crisis del matrimonio”, Anuario de Derecho Civil, 56-1, p. 67 ff.; A. VAQUER 
ALOY (2003), “Wills, Divorce and the Fate of the Dispositions in Favour of the Spouse: a Common Trend in 
European Laws of Succession”, European Review of Private Law, p. 782 ff.; T. F. TORRES GARCÍA (2005), 
“Disposiciones testamentarias y vicisitudes del matrimonio”, in TORRES GARCÍA (ed.), Estudios de Derecho civil 
homenaje... [supra, fn. 18], p. 9 ff.; M. E. GÓMEZ CALLE (2007), Error del testador y el cambio sobrevenido de las 
circunstancias existentes al otorgamiento del testamento, Thomson-Civitas, Cizur Menor. 
 
33 Among many other studies on these transformations, recent overviews may be found in I. GOMÁ LANZÓN 
(2005), “Los derechos del cónyuge viudo”, in J. F. DELGADO DE MIGUEL and M. GARRIDO MELERO (eds.), 
Instituciones de Derecho privado. V.3. Sucesiones: las atribuciones legales, Thomson-Civitas, Cizur Menor, pp. 917-936; 
V. MAGARIÑOS BLANCO (2005), “La libertad de testar”, Revista de Derecho privado, September-October, pp. 20-23. 
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of the past); (ii) the desire to benefit those closest in terms of affection and coexistence and not 
purely blood relatives, which challenges the standard formulae such as the forced share system 
and, in Spain, leaving as much property as possible to the spouse or living partner; (iii) the 
fragility of marital links and the appearance of quasi-matrimonial structures or at least ones that 
seek similar regimes to marriage; (iv) the loss of the family’s character as a production unit, as an 
instrument for the labour and economic integration of its members, which implies less economic 
and professional dependence; (v) the virtual disappearance of the stem family and the softening 
of the obligation to keep property within the family at all costs (coupled with the transformation 
of an agricultural society into an industrial and services society); (vi) in contrast, this 
transformation gives rise to the need to maintain certain family assets undivided, such as 
companies, businesses or industries, which require ad hoc solutions and not obligatory equal 
distribution among forced heirs; (vii) greater life expectancy, which extends family cycles, means 
that children stay at home for longer and inheritances are passed on much later when children 
have established their economic future34 to some extent (depending more on their qualifications 
and training than on inheritance), giving rise to more problems relating to maintenance and 
living together, etc.; (viii) the introduction of “express divorce” mechanisms means that the same 
person is linked to different families and sometimes becomes more distant from their previous 
families (in Spain, the phenomenon of “recomposed families” has been on the rise since the 
divorce law was reformed in 2005: according to statistics published recently, the number of 
divorces doubled within a couple of months after this law was enacted); (ix) the welfare function 
of inheritance has largely been assumed by the public institutions of the Welfare State. 
 
The other great transformation accompanying the changes to the social physiognomy of the 
family has been the metamorphosis of the composition of wealth and estate, affecting its 
distribution mortis causa. Real estate and house are no longer the physical elements of reference: 
the standard flat or block of flats has become fungible, interchangeable, like most rural properties 
and many companies. The number of real estate properties left in estate has tended to decrease 
while the amount of movable property has increased, securities have been dematerialised and 
financial assets acquired greater relevance. The appearance of new methods for investing, saving 
or accumulating wealth, such as life insurance policies, pension funds or investment funds, social 
security insurance or administrative concessions, has meant that wills are no longer the only 
source of redistribution of patrimony; instead, para-successory phenomena are appearing and 
there has been an increase in the number of early successions through transfers inter vivos (with 
immediate effect or enforceable post mortem)35. 
 
                                                 
34 On this, with statistics as argument against the existing forced shares, see recently A. VAQUER ALOY (2007), 
“Reflexiones sobre una eventual reforma de la legítima”, InDret 3/2007, pp. 8-11: in 2003, life expectancy is around 
80 years (whereas at the time of the Civil Code, at the end of XIX century was 35 years), average age of 
descendants at the time of death of their ascendants is between 40 and 55 years old, which coincides with the 
average age when the top incomes/richness are in hands of the eventual heirs. Inheritances (and forced shares) 
are, therefore, received in the moment of best welfare status of the beneficiaries. 
 
35 See SERRANO DE NICOLÁS, “Estate planning: la planificación...” [supra fn. 6], p. 496-497 and 512-514. 
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2.3. Changes originating from case law 
 
The Spanish Supreme Court has been rather creative in “complementing” (article 1.6 Cc) the legal 
regulations governing succession mortis causa36, particularly with regard to some too short 
articles of the Civil Code. The new rules of case law are more technical in nature and less 
associated with the trends in legislative policy mentioned previously (for example, forced share 
of estate has not been extended by analogy to members of unmarried couples). The following 
examples highlight this trend: 
 
1) Inheritance agreements: although the Civil Code (unlike Autonomous Community civil laws) 
generally prohibits inheritance contracts (articles 658, 816 and 1271.2 Cc), case law has 
allowed for such agreements, but only when they deal with known and existing items of 
property when the contract is executed, interpreting the prohibition on agreements about 
“future inheritance” on a restrictive basis only in the sense of the universality of the 
inheritance (the entire inheritance)37. 
 
2) Donations mortis causa: according to prevailing doctrine, article 620 Cc eliminated these 
types of donations as an independent category and also their historical function by 
including them in testamentary provisions (similar to legacies). The Supreme Court has 
endorsed this interpretation, although it has striven to provide a clear definition of its 
features based on the ambiguous rule of the Civil Code, requiring, in order for said rule to 
be enforceable, compliance with the formalities of wills38, or alluding to their revocability39 
(in contrast to pure donations inter vivos) or to the time when they become enforceable or to 
the application of rules governing legacies and forced shares of estate to such donations. 
 
3) The “Socini” clause: in accordance with the general desire to favour the spouse as much as 
possible, despite the insurmountable limit represented by the concurrent forced shares of 
the estate for children, it is standard testamentary practice for testators to designate their 
spouses as legatees in the usufruct of the entire estate and their children as heirs to the bare 
legal title of everything. Thus, children would agree to temporarily receive less quality of 
                                                 
36 On this role, see M. PASQUAU LIAÑO (1994), Código civil y ordenamiento jurídico, Comares, Granada, p. 102 ff.; M. 
PASQUAU LIAÑO (ed.) (2000), Jurisprudencia civil comentada. Código civil, Comares, Granada. 
 
37 Spanish Supreme Court Judgments of May 4 1902, October 8 1915, October 8 1916, October 26 1926, May 16 
1940, June 12 1956, January 24 1957, March 3  1964 and June 22 1997. 
 
38 Spanish Supreme Court Judgments of March 23 1948, June 7 1960, June 13 1994, June 15 1995, July 25 1996, 
December 30 2003 and  March 12 2004. 
 
39 See Spanish Supreme Court Judgments of January 28 1898, June 13 1900, March 27 1957 or December 30 2003. 
Those features are currently the object of dispute in the doctrine, which in most cases does not support the revival 
of mortis causa donations: for contradictory views, see I. BELUCHE RINCÓN (1999), “La donación "mortis causa" 
(desde la prohibición de pactos sucesorios)”, Anuario de derecho civil, 52-3, p. 1057 ff.; M. ESPEJO LERDO DE TEJADA 
(1999), La sucesión contractual en el Código civil, Universidad de Sevilla, Sevilla, p. 125 ff.; M. ESPEJO LERDO DE 
TEJADA (2006), “Donaciones mortis causa. Posibilidades actuales en el Código civil y propuestas de reforma”, in 
Derecho de sucesiones. Presente y Futuro. XII Jornadas... [supra, fn. 4], pp. 241-287; J. B. VALLET DE GOYTISOLO (1978), 
“La donación mortis causa en el Código civil español” in his Estudios sobre donaciones, Montecorvo, Madrid, p. 13 ff. 
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the estate received in exchange for receiving more goods in the medium term (plus 
quantum, minus quale). If such distribution is not accepted, the testator may reduce their 
rights to the estate to the legal minimum and leave the spouse the one third portion of 
estate disposable at will plus his or her right to the usufruct of another one third share. 
These “optional compensatory dispositions for forced share” or “Socini clauses” (named 
after the 16th-Century Italian jurist Mario Socino) are not envisaged in the Civil Code but 
are used in 90% of wills executed by married people with children. Case law has accepted 
their validity based on a broad interpretation of article 820.3 Cc40. 
 
4) “Residual fideicommissary substitution” system. This type of fideicommissary substitution, 
often used in its two modalities of fideicomissum si quid supererit and de eo quod supererit, are 
not expressly regulated by the Civil Code, with the exception of a vague reference in article 
783.2, pursuant to which case law has built a detailed system still in development and still 
with gaps41. This has done away with former reluctance to include this in the Code, due to 
the obligation to keep the property established in article 781 for the fiduciary heir in 
fideicommissary substitution and has incorporated a type of provision originating from the 
testamentary practice. 
 
5) Tacit revocation of the will: case law has softened the rigorous rule of the Civil Code by which 
a previous will could be revoked by a will executed subsequently if the testator does not 
express in this later will his or her desire for the former to prevail entirely or in part (article 
739 Cc). According to the Supreme Court, it is sufficient to understand that there is an 
intention for both wills to prevail; this may be deduced from the will by interpretation and 
it is even sufficient for nothing to have been indicated to the contrary and that both wills 
are not incompatible42. 
 
6) Validity of extrinsic evidence to determine the real will of the testator. This is a creation of case 
law, which permits the use of evidence external to the will (letters, documents, previous 
wills, documents of the testator, witness statements or notarial declarations, etc.) to 
determine the real intentions behind the testator’s dispositions mortis causa, provided that 
the result is somehow supported by the wording of the will and, therefore, falls within the 
scope of interpretation and does not represent the integration of a non-existent intention if 
                                                 
40 Mainly, SCJ of July 10 2003; see also SCJ of December 3 2001 and SCJ of December 29 1939. In any case, the 
number of judgments dealing directly with this clause is actually scarce, surely due to their frequency and clarity. 
The clause is deemed valid expressly in the Law of Catalonia (art. 360), Mallorca and Menorca (art. 49), Aragón 
(art. 185.1) and, to some extent, in the Fuero of Vizcaya in the Basque Country (art. 61). On the topic, see A. REAL 
PÉREZ (1988), Usufructo universal del cónyuge viudo en el Código civil, Montecorvo, Madrid; A. L. CABEZUELO ARENAS 
(2002), Diversas formas de canalización de la cautela socini, Tirant, Valencia; L. F. RAGEL SÁNCHEZ (2004), La cautela 
gualdense o socini y el artículo 820.3º del Código civil, Dykinson, Madrid. 
 
41 Spanish Supreme Court Judgments of November 13 1948, October  25 1954, November 21 1956, January 7 1959, 
April 10 1985, March 13 1989, July 22 1994, May 4 2000, February 12 2002; RDGRN of September 17 2003 [with 
note by S. CÁMARA LAPUENTE (2004), in Cuadernos Civitas de Jurisprudencia, 65, p. 689 ff.]. 
 
42 Spanish Supreme Court Judgments of February 1 1988, May 7 1990 and May 14 1996. Those judgments depart 
from an old and strict interpretation of the case law that required (as the Civil code’s wording) an express 
intention to preserve both wills. 
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a gap is identified43. These last two examples (revocation and interpretation) show the 
tendency of case law to prioritise genuine intentions of the testator without breaching testamentary 
formalism, a principle which the Supreme Court continues to apply rigorously. 
 
7) Old age is not in itself grounds for lack of capacity to testate. This is associated with the factor of 
greater life expectancy, mentioned previously, and there has been an increase in the 
number of lawsuits seeking to revoke wills executed by people in old age, with 
deteriorated physical or mental health, with signs of senile dementia, depression or 
incipient phases of Alzheimer. Spanish case law has continued to uphold that neither old 
age nor the existence of such weaknesses are, in themselves, grounds for declaring such 
people unable to testate and supports this principle on the grounds that the declaration of 
the Notary who considered the elderly person in question as a person of sound mind 
settles a strong presumption of capacity, difficult to rebuke unless absolutely clear evidence 
against (article 663.2 Cc.)44. In this area, consideration is given to the difference between 
incapacity and the lack of autonomy of an elderly person or his or her difficulties to 
communicate45. 
 
8) Non-admission of partial renvoi or remission to the Spanish Law on International Successions. Since 
1996, Spanish case law has established the restrictive conditions in which renvoi or 
remission to Spanish Law in succession matters may be admitted, based on three important 
sentences46 (article 9.8 in relation to article 12 Cc): it has only been possible for succession 
mortis causa to be governed by Spanish Law after this identified, as applicable Law47, a 
                                                 
43 From SCJ of July 8 1940 onwards, case law has admitted this instrument. For instance, Spanish Supreme Court 
Judgments of March 26 1983 [with note by P. SALVADOR CODERCH (1983), in Cuadernos Civitas de Jurisprudencia 
Civil, 1, p. 289 ff.]; February 10 1986; December 31 1992; October 6 1994; January 30 1995; January 30 1997; and 
May 24 2002. On this, see J. B. JORDANO BAREA (1999), El testamento y su interpretación, Comares, Granada, p. 100 ff.; 
A. VAQUER ALOY (2003), La interpretación del testamento, Cálamo, Barcelona, p. 70 ff. (with comparative analysis). 
 
44Spanish Supreme Court Judgments of April 18 1916, October 25 1928, April 26 1995, November 27 1995, January 
27 1998, February 15 2000 and March 31 2004. Only when the lack of capacity to express the testamentary will is 
fully proven by medical evidence may a will be declared void (SCJ of May 18 1998 and SCJ of July 24 1995). 
 
45 A. M. RODRÍGUEZ GUITIÁN (2006), La capacidad de testar: especial referencia al testador anciano, Thomson-Civitas, 
Cizur Menor, p. 90 ff. 
 
46 Spanish Supreme Court Judgments of November 15 1996, May 21 1999 and September 23 2002. On those 
judgments and problems, M. VIRGÓS SORIANO and E. RODRÍGUEZ PINEAU (2004), “Succession law and renvoi: the 
Spanish solution”, in H. P. MANSEL  et al. (eds.), Festschrift für Erik Jayme, Sellier, München, p. 977 ff.; M. VIRGÓS 
SORIANO (2004), “Derecho de sucesiones y reenvío: la respuesta del sistema español”, Anales de la Academia 
Matritense del Notariado, p. 181 ff.; S. ÁLVAREZ GONZÁLEZ (2005), “Dos cuestiones de actualidad en el reciente 
Derecho internacional privado español de sucesiones: los derechos del cónyuge supérstite y el reenvío”, in TORRES 
GARCÍA (ed.), Estudios de Derecho civil homenaje... [supra, fn. 18], p. 131 ff.; T. ORTIZ DE LA TORRE (2003), “¿Anular por 
reenvío la voluntad del testador?”, La Ley, September 9, p. 1 ff.; E. CASTELLANOS RUIZ (2004), “Reenvío, unidad de 
la sucesión y armonía internacional de soluciones en el Derecho sucesorio antes y después de la STS de 23 de 
septiembre de 2002”, in A. L. CALVO CARAVACA and E. CASTELLANOS RUIZ (eds.), El Derecho de familia ante el siglo 
XXI: aspectos internacionales, Colex, Madrid, p. 239 ff.; E. CASTELLANOS RUIZ (2007), “Sucesión hereditaria”, in 
CALVO A. L. CARAVACA and J. CARRASCOSA GONZÁLEZ (eds.), Derecho internacional privado, 8th ed., Comares, 
Granada, II, p. 291 ff. 
 
47 The single connecting factor in Spain is the nationality of the de cuius. According to article 9.8 of the Spanish 
Civil Code, succession by reason of death shall be governed by the national Law of the person whose succession is 
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foreign law that, given its rules (whereby succession is governed by the deceased’s last 
domicile or estate is divided into movable property items according to its own law and into 
immovable property according to its location following the lex rei sitae), allows for 
remission to Spanish law if two conditions are fulfilled: the remission must respect the 
principles of unity and universality of Spanish private international law in the succession 
(without subjecting the succession to various different laws); and acceptance of the 
remission must lead to an international harmony on solutions (hence the results obtained 
with Spanish law is similar to the one that would have been reached with the foreign law). 
With this new restrictive interpretation on the part of the Spanish Supreme Court, it will be 
difficult to apply the remission procedure in Spanish legal practice in relation to 
international successions, unless (and this is debatable) the second requirement is made 
less restrictive and the only items in the inheritance correspond to immovable property 
located in Spain (according to the controversial Supreme Court judgment of 23 September 
2002, i.e. when remission is en bloc to Spanish Law). 
 
2.4. Changes originating from daily practice 
 
We can still identify some other clear trends, originating from standard legal practice, which have 
not yet left such clear-cut marks in case law. This lack of endorsement through judicial decisions 
is normally due to their legality, but their very existence outside the specific provisions of the 
Civil Code reflects the desire of testators to achieve, through indirect mechanisms, certain 
objectives for which legal reforms should perhaps be introduced. Specifically, it is worth 
highlighting the following: (i) the execution of two correlative wills by both husband and wife, 
before the same notary and with identical reciprocal dispositions and declarations to benefit third 
parties, reflecting their intention to execute a joint will48, which is prohibited by the Civil Code; 
(ii) the different dispositions to protect the patrimony of persons conceived but not yet born 
(nascituri) and concepturi, through the fideicommissary substitution, designation of fiduciaries, ad 
hoc testamentary executors or administrators, legacies under condition, etc.49; (iii) the exclusion 
by will of intestate heirs of the de cuius in the event of opening such an intestate succession50 and 
other atypical testamentary dispositions51; (iv) the increase in estate planning independently of 
                                                                                                                                                        
in question at the moment of his or her death, regardless of either the nature of the assets in the estate or 
whatever may be the country in which they are located. Moreover, the “remission to foreign Law shall be 
understood as made to its substantive Law, without taking into account the renvoi that its conflicting rules may 
make to a law other than Spanish Law (article 12.2 Cc.). Therefore, “second degree” renvoi (to the rules of a third 
country) is forbidden under Spanish Law and the “return renvoi” or “first degree” renvoi (back to Spanish Law) is 
only allowed in the field of succession Law and very restrictively according to this new case law. 
 
48 For instance, see M. YZQUIERDO TOLSADA (2002), “La planificación hereditaria”, Revista General de Legislación y 
Jurisprudencia, 3, 2002, p. 486 ff. 
 
49 Vid. MARTÍNEZ GARCÍA, “Las disposiciones patrimoniales...” [supra, fn. 27] p. 27 ff. 
 
50 S. CÁMARA LAPUENTE (2000), La exclusión testamentaria de los herederos legales, Civitas, Madrid. Recently admitted 
in Aragon (arts. 198-199) and partially in Galicia (art. 226 of the Law 2/2006). 
 
51 L. FERNÁNDEZ DEL MORAL (1996), Autonomía privada y testamento en derecho común: contribución al estudio de las 
disposiciones testamentarias atípicas, Comares, Granada. 
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traditional forms of succession mortis causa; (v) the modern methods for achieving a more 
efficient transition of the family business after the death of any of its members. 
 
Estate planning, which has no strong tradition in Spain, unlike the situation in other legal 
systems, particularly in Common Law systems, is being used more and more in recent times, 
particularly for the transmission of large fortunes. Alternative testamentary instruments (so-
called “will substitutes”) are used by testators to transfer estate upon death for numerous reasons: 
sometimes the aim is to anticipate the transmission of the owner’s estate in life independently of 
the formalities and limits of the inheritance (particularly to elude forced shares whenever 
possible); on other occasions, the aim is to ensure the transmission of property during the life of 
the principal but postponing the full enforceability of said transmission until the moment of the 
person’s death; or they may use such instruments in order to obtain advantageous tax treatment. 
Sometimes these objectives are achieved through contracts or specific company instruments that 
pay certain amounts or income from the content of the estate which are received by the 
contractually established beneficiaries: this is the case with life insurance policies, pension plans, 
mutual funds, life annuities, bank deposits or pre-emptive right agreements in the case of death 
of a partnership shareholder. On other occasions this is achieved through the use of standard 
contracts entered into on the basis of their enforceability post mortem, such as donations 
(conditional upon the survival of the donee or with the reservation of the power to dispose until 
the death), stipulation in favour of third parties post mortem or post mortem or trans mortem 
mandates52. Trusts are not recognised by Spanish Law, although similar instruments or devices 
are frequently used such as fiduciary contracts inter vivos and fiducias mortis causa to carry out 
functions similar to estate management and election of beneficiaries53; these types of trusts are 
governed by case law and the different regulations of the Autonomous Community civil law 
systems.  
 
Spain still has no specific civil law system governing succession in family businesses54 (although tax 
benefits are provided), despite Recommendation 1994/1069/EC, of 7 December, and the 
European Commission Communication of 28 March 1998 on the transfer of SMEs. In 2000 a 
report was published by the Spanish Senate containing numerous guidelines aimed at 
strengthening family businesses, although it did not recommend the development of specific 
legal rules to integrate all aspects relating to this matter. Some of the Senate’s warnings were 
                                                 
52 For a detailed description of these instruments, see K. J. ALBIEZ DOHRMANN (1998), Negocios atributivos post 
mortem, Cedecs, Barcelona; ALBIEZ DOHRMANN, “Disposiciones patrimoniales en vida...”, 2005 [supra, fn. 18], p. 
581 ff.; R. SÁNCHEZ ARISTI (2003), Dos alternativas a la sucesión testamentaria: pactos sucesorios y contratos post mortem, 
Comares, Granada; SERRANO DE NICOLÁS, “Estate planning: la planificación de la herencia...” [supra, fn. 6], p. 491 ff. 
 
53 See S. CÁMARA LAPUENTE (1999), “Trusts in Spanish Law”, in M. CANTIN-CUMYN (ed.), La fiducie face au trust dans 
les rapports d’affaires / Trust vs Fiducie in a business context, Bruylant, Bruxelles, p. 191 ff.; S. CÁMARA LAPUENTE 
(2003), “El trust y la fiducia: posibilidades para una armonización europea”, in S. CÁMARA LAPUENTE (ed.), Derecho 
privado europeo, Colex, Madrid, p. 1099 ff.; S. CÁMARA LAPUENTE (2005), “Elementos para una regulación del trust”, 
in GARRIDO/FUGARDO El patrimonio familiar..., [supra, fn. 6], III, p. 523 ff.;  S. CÁMARA LAPUENTE (2005), “Trust a la 
francesa”, InDret 2/2005, pp. 1-41; U. MATTEI, M. GRAZIADEI and L. SMITH (eds.) (2005), Commercial trusts in 
European Private Law, CUP, Cambridge. 
 
54 See M. L. PALAZÓN GARRIDO (2003), La sucesión por causa de muerte en la empresa mercantil, Tirant lo Blanch, 
Valencia. 
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taken into account in Law 7/2003, of 1 April, which, together with other measures, particularly in 
connection with succession mortis causa matters, allowed companies to be transferred to one heir 
and compensating the others by awarding them their forced shares in money (vid. supra I.1.1.1.a). 
The legal gap is being filled by family protocols, which are atypical agreements entered into 
between family members; the clauses of these agreements on the future ownership, management 
and distribution of work and benefits are not all binding: some of these protocols are genuine 
legally-binding agreements, whereas others are more like moral commitments. Some specific 
problems exist in connection with clauses on mortis causa transfers of companies or shares55, such 
as the commitment to make a will as provided in the protocol (this may be unlawful since 
inheritance agreements are prohibited under the Civil Code, with the exception described 
previously; penalties for testating against the agreement could also not be imposed by virtue of 
articles 737 and 794 Cc, which preserves the absolute freedom to make wills), the breach of duties 
on forced shares if these shares are not paid at least in money to the other forced heirs, the need 
to respect established deadlines against long-standing vinculations on property or the 
unenforceability of donations promised in the protocol. The growing use of family protocols in 
Spain in recent years has still not completely resolved some of these problems. 
 
2.5. Specific issue: the principle of free will or the restriction of testamentary autonomy 
 
The principle of free will to determine succession mortis causa can be divided into two areas: a 
formal side, with either more or fewer available instruments; and a material side, where the 
restrictions stem mainly from the existence of a larger or smaller forced shares. The debate on 
these issues has strongly intensified in Spain in recent years. 
 
a. Formal freedom: successory instruments 
 
In the Civil Code voluntary succession is governed exclusively by individual wills (article 658 Cc) 
and the Spanish Supreme Court continues to be absolutely rigorous in its demand for compliance 
with all legally established requirements (ex article 687 Cc), with mere knowledge of the testator’s 
intentions being insufficient, even if this is clear, in the event of non-compliance with compulsory 
requirements56. A similar principle is applied in Autonomous Community civil law systems, but 
there are other formats for distributing inheritance: codicils, testamentary memories, inheritance 
agreements (in the six autonomous communities with their own civil law systems) and joint wills 
(Aragon and Navarre for several centuries; recently only admitted in Guipúzcoa within the 
Basque Country and in Galicia since 1995). In doctrine, many authors support the need to 
                                                 
55 A comprehensive critical view with further references in I. GOMÁ LANZÓN (2005), “El protocolo familiar”, in 
GARRIDO/FUGARDO, El patrimonio familiar..., [supra, fn. 6], IV, p. 654 ff., particularly, p. 683 ff. In the same book, a 
number of studies on the topic may be consulted. Also see F. VICENT CHULIÁ (2000), “Organización jurídica de la 
sociedad familiar”, Revista de Derecho Patrimonial, 5, p. 21 ff. 
 
56 Ad exemplum, Spanish Supreme Court Judgments of March 8 1975, June 21 1986 (nullity by lack of expression of 
the hour in a notarial will), May 9 1990, April 25 1991, June 16 1997, April 29 1999. There are only some old and 
few examples of certain flexibility: SCJ of February 28 1906 and SCJ of March 15 1951. 
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incorporate joint wills in the Civil Code57 in view of the benefits it affords, the positive and 
successful experience from its use in regional legal systems in the Basque Country and Navarre, 
the disappearance or rebuttal of arguments used against these instruments in the 19th Century 
(“captation” or obtaining succession by insidious means, fraud, loss of testamentary freedom, 
etc.) and the confirmation of the widespread practice by married testators who make two official 
wills in the form of one joint will (supra, section 3). Similar arguments are used with respect to 
inheritance agreements, although on this point academic doctrine is perhaps slightly more 
divided58; there should surely be fewer technical problems because these instruments were 
admitted for a while within the scope of the Civil Code under the Law of 24 April 1958, in 
connection with the successory rights of adoptive children (until 1970), and from 1981 to 1995 in 
relation to agreements on successions in agricultural businesses. Both issues continue to depend 
above all on reasons of opportunity and legislative policy.  
 
b. Material freedom and forced share: to be or not to be? 
 
i) Summary of systems co-existing in Spain and their trends 
 
The greater or lesser freedom regarding the content of wills and the portion of property freely 
disposable by testators is the essence of any succession system. In Spain, the maximum 
exponent of the diversity of legal systems is the greater or lesser flexibility of the legítimas 
(forced shares or statutory shares of estate). The seven legal systems regulate forced shares of 
inheritances but there are various elements that reveal important differences between them 
(for details see table of Annex 2)59:  
 
1)  In terms of the content or amount of these forced shares, some Autonomous Community 
laws award testators complete freedom to determine them, since the forced share is not 
patrimonial in nature (Navarre) or allows the testator to freely exclude forced heirs from 
the inheritance (Fuero de Ayala, within the Basque Country), whereas the other systems 
apply different rules on shares: thus, for children some laws establish a small portion (1/4 
                                                 
57 J. J. CASTIELLA RODRÍGUEZ (1993), "El testamento mancomunado, institución exportable al Código civil", Revista 
Jurídica de Navarra, 15, p. 35 ff., and in Revista Jurídica del Notariado, 39, 2001, p. 9 ff.; J. R. GARCÍA VICENTE (2006), 
“El testamento mancomunado: razones para la derogación del artículo 669 del Código civil”, in Derecho de 
sucesiones. Presente y futuro. XII Jornadas... [supra, fn. 4], p. 289 ff., both with comprehensive arguments. On similar 
proposals by notaries and scholars, see infra 3.1. 
 
58 In favour of the admission of inheritance contracts in the Civil Code, DELGADO ECHEVERRÍA, “Una propuesta...”, 
[supra, fn. 4], § 12.3, p. 134-136; J. L. LACRUZ BERDEJO et al.(2004), Elementos de Derecho civil. V. Sucesiones, 2nd ed., 
Dykinson, Madrid, p. 300-301; R. SÁNCHEZ ARISTI (2006), “Pactos sucesorios. Propuesta para una reforma del 
Código civil”, in Derecho de sucesiones. Presente y futuro. XII Jornadas..., [supra, fn. 4] § 1.A, p. 477 ff.; R. SÁNCHEZ 
ARISTI, “Dos alternativas...” [supra, fn. 51], p. 237-238. Against, ESPEJO LERDO DE TEJADA, La sucesión contractual... 
[supra, fn. 38], p. 91 ff. 
 
59 Before the reform of the Civil Law of Galicia by Law 2/2006 of 14th June, the amount of the legítima and the 
persons entitled to it where identical to the Civil Code by express remission of the Galician Law. For an overview 
on the different systems, see, for instance, M. MARTÍN CASALS and J. SOLÉ FELIU (2001), “Testierfreiheit im 
innerspanischen Vergleich” in D. HENRICH and D. SCHWAB (eds.), Familienerbrecht und Testierfreiheit im europäischen 
Vergleich, Gieseking, Bielefeld, p. 310 ff.; M. FERNÁNDEZ HIERRO (2004), La sucesión forzosa. Estudio sobre las legítimas 
y reservas en el Derecho común y foral, Comares, Granada. 
 29
InDret 4/2007 Sergio Cámara Lapuente 
in Catalonia and, since 2006, in Galicia), whereas others consume virtually the entire estate 
(4/5 in the Fuero de Vizcaya, within the Basque Country, although this is a collective share 
that can be distributed among all the children freely), and even one law (in the Balearic 
Islands) establishes different shares according to the children surviving the de cuius. In the 
Civil Code, the forced share allocable to children and descendants is 2/3 of the inheritance, 
but this share (legítima larga or “broad forced share”, which is the sum formed by the 
legítima estricta or “strict forced share”, equivalent to one third of total value divided 
equally among the lawful heirs, and the tercio de mejora, literally the “third for betterment”) 
is divided into two parts: 1/3 (the legítima corta) must be left in equal portions, and without 
encumbrances, to all the children (or descendants if there are no children), and another 1/3 
(mejora or betterment) may be distributed freely by the testator among all his or her 
children and descendants. This third allows the testator to improve the position of any 
children or descendants; and represents a genuine attempt, within the comparative context, 
at making regulations on forced share more flexible, since, together with the freely-
disposable third of estate, it furnishes testators with a mechanism for leaving most of their 
estates to one of their children. 
 
2) There are also noteworthy differences regarding the subjects entitled to claim the forced 
share. With regard to ascendants, there are three scenarios, within which the shares also 
vary according to the specific system in question: forced shares may be awarded to parents 
and (in their absence) ascendants (Civil Code and various parts of the Basque Country), to 
the parents only (Catalonia and the Balearic Islands) or no forced shares may be awarded 
to parents (Aragon, Navarre and, since 2006, Galicia). The rights of surviving spouses also 
vary enormously and, without taking into consideration the serious objections to their 
classification as genuine forced heirs, various trends may be identified: (i) acknowledge 
their legal right to a share of property (only in Catalonia), award them a legal share of the 
estate in usufruct (Civil Code, Galicia and areas under the Vizcaya and Ayala Laws 
systems in the Basque Country) or award them the legal usufruct on the entire estate 
(Aragón and Navarre always; Mallorca-Menorca, only if there are no children); (ii) some 
laws that only award a share in usufruct to the widow, allow testators to voluntarily and 
expressly increase the aforementioned usufruct to cover the entire inheritance (Galicia and 
areas under the Vizcaya and Ayala Laws systems in the Basque Country). As can be seen, 
in this area the law expressly acknowledges the general tendency of many testators who, 
within the scope of the Civil Code, where this is not expressly permitted because it 
represents a breach of the children’s forced share, feel obliged to resort to the “trick” of 
“Socini clause” (supra, I.2); (iii) in most of the systems, the share of the surviving spouse is 
regulated under mandatory law and only disappears if proven and fixed grounds can be 
presented (remarriage or living together as a de facto couple, etc.). However, there are 
exceptions: in Catalonia, this right is only granted in event of need; in Ibiza and 
Formentera, there is no usufructuary share if there is no will, but this share is awarded 
when the intestate succession takes place; and in the Basque Country, the Fuero de Ayala, 
which affords maximum freedom in this respect, is the only system that allows testators to 
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withdraw the widow/widower’s usufruct without having to justify legal grounds for such 
decision. 
 
3) There are also substantial differences regarding the methods for calculating and paying forced 
shares and their legal nature (rights in personam against the estate or not, pars valoris, pars 
bonorum, etc.)60. 
 
ii) The current debate regarding the suppression of the “legítima” 
 
This is the legislative panorama in Spain today, after various revisions of the Autonomous 
Community civil law systems. In recent years, and particularly in the last three, an extremely 
interesting debate has re-emerged in Spain among notaries, academics and practitioners on the 
appropriateness of suppressing forced shares or making the regime governing them more flexible. A 
similar dispute took place in the 19th Century before the Spanish Civil Code was approved. 
The arguments then were the same as they are now but the underlying factors fuelling 
controversy were different, namely that a single Civil Code for all Spain was at stake and 
there was a struggle to reflect the irreconcilable traditions of Spanish Law and the different 
“foral” regions in this Code regarding the issue of testamentary freedom. With the approval of 
the Civil Code and eventually various Autonomous Community laws, this cause of cultural 
and political conflict in relation to testamentary matters has disappeared. But Spain continues 
to offer clear examples of the difficulties involved in harmonising essential aspects of Law of 
Succession, such as the forced shares, in international proposals. Today, the reopening of the 
debate (a general debate, but focusing more on the system of legítimas provided in the Civil 
Code)61 is closely related to the social, family and patrimonial changes described previously 
(I.1.2.9). To summarise, we will now examine in detail the arguments in favour and against 
greater testamentary freedom in order to sketch after a summary of the main proposals for 
reform62. 
                                                 
60 An updated review of the different theories in TORRES GARCÍA, “Legítima y legitimarios y libertad de testar 
(síntesis de un sistema), in Derecho de sucesiones. Presente y futuro. XII Jornadas..., [supra, fn. 4], pp. 191-203. 
 
61 The current project to review the whole successory system in Catalonia, in the frame of the enactment of the 
Catalonian Civil Code (Book IV on Succession Law now under debate in the Parliament of Catalonia: see 
blueprint in http://www.parlament-cat.net/activitat/bopc/08b033.pdf) focuses on devices to reckon the forced 
shares in relation to previous gifts (computación, imputación...), but does not modify neither the amount of the 
forced share nor the persons entitled to it; there is not (at least yet) a similar strong debate on the Catalonian 
forced share. For a short overview of this future reform as for the legítima in Catalonia, see E. ARROYO I 
AMAYUELAS (2007), “Pflichtteilsrecht in Spanien”, in RÖTHEL, A. (ed.), Reformfragen des Pflichtteilsrechts (Symposium 
vom 30.11-2.12.2006 in Salzau), Carl Heymanns, Köln, pp. 274-275; VAQUER ALOY, “Reflexiones sobre una eventual 
reforma de la legítima”, [supra, fn. 34], p. 11-12. 
 
62 For further information on the reasons and references to (old and recent) authors, see mainly ARROYO I 
AMAYUELAS, “Pflichtteilsrecht in Spanien” [supra, fn. 61], pp. 268-276; M. M. BERMEJO PUMAR (2005), “La legítima 
(función y estructura)”, in J. F. DELGADO DE MIGUEL and M. GARRIDO MELERO (eds.), Instituciones de Derecho privado. 
V.3. Sucesiones: las atribuciones legales, Thomson-Civitas, Cizur Menor, p. 21 ff.; A. CALATAYUD SIERRA (1995), 
“Consideraciones acerca de la libertad de testar”, Academia Sevillana del Notariado, IX, p. 241 ff.; M. T. CARRANCHO 
HERRERO (2006), ”Reflexión crítica de los derechos sucesorios del cónyuge viudo en el actual modelo de familia”, 
in ABRIL/AMAT (eds.), Libro Homenaje al Prof. Luis Puig Ferriol, cit. [supra, fn. 9], I, p. 733 ff.; A. CARRASCO PERERA 
(2003), “Acoso y derribo de la legítima hereditaria”, Actualidad Jurídica Aranzadi, 580, June, p. 11 ff.; M. E. COBAS 
COBIELLA (2006), “Hacia un nuevo enfoque de las legítimas”, Revista de Derecho Patrimonial, 17, p. 49 ff.; P. DE LA 
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• Arguments in favour of forced shares (“legítimas”): 
 
a) Legal arguments: (i) existence of a type of family co-ownership of property; (ii) the mejora (one 
third of the inheritance) already allows for a more flexible system of forced shares, albeit 
only in favour of descendants; (iii) it is a matter of public order that cannot be suppressed (as 
affirmed in the Supreme Court judgment of 23 October 1992, but, after better consideration, 
rejected by the Supreme Court judgment dated 12 February 1999, in view of the diversity of 
the Spanish legislative system); (iv) it is an equivalent or subrogate of the maintenance rights 
of certain relatives. 
 
b) Ethical-family arguments: (i) the equality of all the children before the law makes equal 
treatment obligatory in Law of Succession; (ii) children are the clear successors of the 
physical and spiritual personality of their parents, hence they should also be the successors 
of their patrimonial personality; (iii) a moral duty exists towards descendants, ascendants 
and spouses in both life and after death in accordance with the minima established by law; 
(iv) forced shares derive from Natural Law, on the same grounds of law as the duty to feed 
and maintenance; (v) the suppression of forced shares would infringe family unity and 
increase litigation, particularly if strangers become rich at the expense of more direct 
relatives. 
 
c) Economic arguments: (i) forced shares favour movement in property and avoid permanent 
vinculations with respect to goods; (ii) reciprocal family support in the obtainment of 
property requires family members to participate in its distribution after the death of the 
holder or owner. 
 
d) Other arguments: the long historical tradition gives rise to strong inertia that is difficult to 
break down immediately. 
 
• Arguments in favour of testamentary freedom: 
 
a) Legal arguments: (i) the family as such does not own estate and, hence, at least a distinction 
would have to be made between items of property received freely from the family itself and 
items of property acquired by the own efforts of the testator; (ii) it is incoherent to allow 
owners total freedom in life with respect to their property transfers and contracts they enter 
into and restrict them with respect to their mortis causa transfers; (iii) although the duty to 
feed and to provide maintenance and the forced share are based on the common principle of 
                                                                                                                                                        
ESPERANZA RODRÍGUEZ (2002), “Perspectiva de la legítima. Notas para una revisión”, Libro Homenaje a Ildefonso 
Sánchez Mera, Consejo General del Notariado, Madrid, I, p. 1097 ff.; DELGADO ECHEVERRÍA, “Una propuesta...” 
[supra, fn. 4], p. 122-131; MAGARIÑOS BLANCO, “La libertad de testar”, [supra, fn. 33]; TORRES GARCÍA, “Legítima y 
legitimarios...” [supra, fn. 60]; J. J. RIVAS MARTÍNEZ (2004), Derecho de sucesiones. Común y foral, 3rd ed., Dykinson, 
Madrid, II-1, pp. 346-347; E. VALLADARES RASCÓN (2004), “Por una reforma del sistema sucesorio del Código 
civil”, in J. M. GONZÁLEZ PORRAS and F. P. MÉNDEZ GONZÁLEZ (eds.), Libro homenaje al profesor Manuel Albaladejo 
García, Universidad de Murcia, Murcia, II, p. 4893 ff.; VAQUER ALOY, “Reflexiones sobre una eventual reforma de 
la legítima”, [supra, fn. 34], p. 3-19. Of those authors, some in favour of the suppression of the legítima are notaries 
(BERMEJO, CALATAYUD, DE LA ESPERANZA, MAGARIÑOS). 
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the duty to protect the family, the former is based on the real need of the beneficiary, 
whereas the latter is an arbitrary fixed share, which does not examine the real economic 
needs of the forced heirs; (iv) the example of some Autonomous Community civil law 
systems that allow maximum testamentary freedom and the tendency of comparative law in 
this area are worth imitating; (v) there are various examples in daily practice that the legal 
system governing forced shares fails to cater for the needs and desires of most testators: thus, 
the frequent use of wills to try to modify the distribution of the Code, the regular use of the 
“Socini clause”, the huge number of lawsuits concerning the disinheritance of relatives 
outside the scope of legally accepted grounds of law or the changes in “legal residence” to 
avail of a system allowing greater testamentary freedom (Supreme Court judgment of 5 
April 1994) and even the allegation of false residence for this purpose (Appeal Court of 
Vizcaya, judgment of 15 June 2001); (vi) various legislative changes have shown that the 
primary functions of forced shares have disappeared: equal treatment of all children born in 
and outside marriage, and the rights of non-relatives such as the spouse, today question the 
historical roots whereby the forced share system tries to maintain property within the 
lineage or original family; and forced shares are no longer used to ensure that all children 
receive so-called production assets because they can be compensated with money, and the 
exceptions continue (Law 41/2003); (vii) the local regime protecting forced shares has 
become so technically complex that it exceeds practical needs; (viii) the suppression of forced 
shares would not violate the Spanish Constitution. Although this matter is not so 
controversial as in other countries (e.g. in Germany, see BGH judgment of 19 April 2005), 
only some authors consider that full testamentary freedom would be fully in line with the 
Constitution, deriving from the fundamental right to the free development of personality, as 
well as due to the lack of a real social function of forced shares, which are now an obstacle to 
that function: testamentary freedom would improve the protection of the family and the 
Constitution only recognises “the right to private property and to the inheritance” (article 
33)63; instead of the forced share, a part of the doctrine promotes the admission of 
maintenance duties post mortem only in cases of genuine need. 
 
b) Ethical-family arguments: (i) only testamentary freedom can do justice to relatives who depend 
on the testator, because not all of them have the same needs or merits; the mechanical, 
egalitarian and abstract application of the law does not enable fair inequalitisation in favour 
of minors, disabled people, poorer relatives, etc.; (ii) greater freedom will strengthen the 
authority of parents at the helm of family life; (iii) the forced share system is an obstacle to 
the satisfaction of socially legitimate interests, such as spouses’ capacity to guarantee the 
well-being of their partners. 
 
                                                 
63 Against the abolition of the forced share for constitutional reasons, A. M. LÓPEZ LÓPEZ (1994), “La garantía 
institucional de la herencia”, Derecho privado y Constitución, 3, p. 35 ff.; TORRES GARCÍA, “Legítima y legitimarios...” 
[supra, fn. 60], p. 41 ff. In favour of its abolition, arguing the constitutionality of that reform, DE LA ESPERANZA 
RODRÍGUEZ, “Perspectiva de la legítima...”, [supra, fn. 62], p. 1115 ff.; MAGARIÑOS, “La libertad de testar” [supra, fn. 
33], p. 25-27; VALLADARES, “Por una reforma...” [supra, fn. 62], p. 4901; ARROYO I AMAYUELAS, “Pflichteilsrecht in 
Spanien” [supra, fn. 61], p. 273; with a slightly different approach, promotes de constitutional possibility of reforming 
the legítima, with some nuances and limits, such as the need of protection of the family, VAQUER ALOY, 
“Reflexiones sobre una eventual reforma de la legítima” [supra, fn. 34], pp. 12-14. 
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c) Economic arguments: (i) the absence of forced shares would make it easier to maintain family 
estate intact and its productivity; (ii) it also makes it easier for testators to be sure they 
choose the most ideal successor for this purpose and it also favours succession within the 
company. 
d) Sociological arguments: today different changes, such as greater life expectancy or the very 
absence of the transfer of economic and social power through inheritances64, are altering the 
need for, and efficiency of, the forced shares system; changes in the structures of families and 
estate corroborate this hypothesis. 
 
Support for the need to broaden testamentary freedom within the scope of the Spanish Civil 
Code is virtually unanimous, among notaries and scholars for example (vid. infra II.1), although 
there are more radical and more moderate supporters of this principle. Some suggest suppressing 
all forced shares in general, others propose eliminating the forced shares of parents and 
ascendants and reducing those of children, and others recommend eliminating forced shares and 
replacing them with a series of support benefits similar to maintenance (article 142 Cc) that 
would be deducted from the estate if needed by these relatives65; at present, parental authority 
and the maintenance obligation end when the principal dies (articles 169 and 150 Cc.), hence 
different formulae have been presented to cater for this extension of testamentary freedom 
without neglecting the real duties of family maintenance.  
 
Regarding the legal rights of spouses in mortis causa successions, a wide variety of proposals have 
also been presented. There is a general consensus that regulations should be introduced to benefit 
spouses more and that their minimum rights in usufruct do not reflect current social realities: 
from a legal standpoint, spouses bear a larger legal burden with respect to their partners 
(guardianship, maintenance, etc.) than blood relatives, but the gradual increase in their 
obligations has not proportionally improved their rights; furthermore, some of the latest legal 
reforms, such as the declaration of testamentary equality of all children (in 1981), and the 
removal of the latest discrimination against children born in adultery (in 2005), have reduced 
their rights to inheritance. For these reasons, a general consensus exists that the minimum rights in 
usufruct acknowledged today are insufficient. The numerous proposals for reform go in two 
directions: either extending their legal rights (as done in the Basque Country in 1992) along one of 
these ways, namely increasing their share in usufruct or granting them a share (in property or 
equivalent to the value of this property) in property66, or, in the other direction, reducing the 
legal share of children to allow testators to freely dispose of a larger part of the estate in favour of 
                                                 
64 See fn. 34 for details. 
 
65 For detailed proposals in this sense, see DELGADO ECHEVERRÍA, “Una propuesta...” [supra, fn. 4], §§ 10.2 to 11.4, 
pp. 119-131; MAGARIÑOS, “La libertad de testar” [supra, fn. 33], pp. 27-29; GOMÁ LANZÓN, “Los derechos del 
cónyuge...” [supra, fn. 33], pp. 934-935. Against those reforms, TORRES GARCÍA, “Legítima y legitimarios...”, [supra, 
fn. 60], pp. 220-224 and 227. Also against the “quasi-maintenance” solution is VAQUER ALOY (“Reflexiones sobre 
una eventual reforma de la legítima” [supra, fn. 34], pp. 14-15), who uphold the problem of determining the 
moment of necessity, the confrontation with the traditional system of fixed shares and the high transaction costs; 
this author proposes a fixed (and reduced) forced share only for descendants up to 25 years old and for disabled 
persons. 
 
66 Thus, for instance, CARRANCHO, “Reflexión crítica...”, [supra, fn. 62], I, pp. 747-750. 
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the spouse (as was done in Aragon in 1999 or in Galicia in 2006). This final proposal is surely the 
most coherent, since it strengthens genuine testamentary freedom in accordance with the new 
social principles, which may also be combined with new maintenance rights post mortem (or at 
least with the reduction of the number of other forced heirs and the amount of their right). This 
approximation to models used in Common Law is evident. Of course, the economic regime of 
marriage and the rights recognised to spouses in intestate successions67 must also be brought into 
line with these proposals.  
 
3. Comparative legal analysis and new lege ferenda proposals in Spanish Law of 
Succession 
 
3.1. Proposals of the Spanish Association of Professors of Civil Law and of the Spanish 
Notaries 
 
So far no publicly recognised commission has been set up by the Government to propose 
legislative reforms based on comparative research. However, an interesting academic initiative 
has prepared these proposals for changes to Law of Succession in which special attention has 
been given to comparative law, not just within the Spanish legal system but also focusing on 
foreign jurisdictions (particularly the reforms and proposals of French Law and Puerto Rican 
Law [2005-2006], taking into account that Puerto Rican Law of Succession is still based on the 
Spanish Civil Code).  
 
The XII Seminar of the Association of Professors of Civil Law was held in Santander on February 
9-11 2006, on the monographic theme of the revision and reform of Law of Succession. The 
seminars were inaugurated by the General Director of Registries and Notary’s Offices (Ministry 
of Justice). All the preparatory material, surveys, speeches and conclusions are available on the 
Association’s web page. The Association would present its conclusions to the Ministry of Justice. 
The work was structured as follows: two general speeches were to be given, one by Professor T. 
TORRES GARCÍA on Legítimas, legitimarios y libertad de testar (“Forced shares, forced heirs and 
testamentary freedom”), which reviewed the main problems in this area, and the other by 
Professor J. DELGADO ECHEVERRÍA, entitled Una propuesta de política del Derecho en materia de 
successiones por causa de muerte (“A proposal for legislative policy on successions mortis causa”), 
which was divided into two parts: a general section on the contribution of Legal Science to the 
tasks of legislating and another on the “objectives of a reform of Law of Succession”. The aspects 
relating to this are undoubtedly more interesting and innovative given their material content and 
results. To complement this general speech, eight other academics were asked to prepare 
speeches on specific subjects. Two surveys based on questionnaires were carried out among all 
the associates and conclusions were drafted and voted on in the Association’s plenary meeting68. 
The ten speeches addressed and developed different aspects of Comparative Law. To give an 
                                                 
67 See specially M. PÉREZ ESCOLAR (2003), El cónyuge supérstite en la sucesión intestada, Dykinson, Madrid; also E. 
CORRAL GARCÍA (2007), Los derechos del cónyuge viudo en el Derecho civil común y autonómico, Bosch, Barcelona. 
 
68 Some of those papers have been quoted throughout this study (see printed version reference supra, fn. 4). 
Although the results of the polls are very interesting, only 49 scholars answered. 
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idea of the proposals (the final survey-questionnaire contained 34 questions and there were 20 
conclusions), these were some of the most significant conclusions, which did not always coincide 
with the proposals of the speeches: 
 
1) It was recommended that the call order in intestate successions be modified, in particular to 
give priority to surviving spouses over ascendants and include them in first call together 
with the descendants at least in one share (1/3). For this solution, special consideration was 
given to the measures adopted in the reform of the French Law of 3 December 200169. 
 
2) It was recommended that the Civil Code be modified to guarantee the enforceability of 
legacies of universal usufruct in favour of surviving spouses, in the presence of any forced 
heirs. 
 
3) It was recommended that the forced share system of the Civil Code be reformed. On this 
point, a full consensus was not reached on the purpose of the reform, although the 
conclusions took into account the possibility of suppressing the legítimas of ascendants, 
except the maintenance allocations, and reducing the forced shares of descendants, 
generalising their payment in money, even if this money is not part of the estate. Regarding 
the forced shares of widowed spouses, no consensus was reached on the purpose of its 
reform. 
 
4) It was recommended that joint wills and inheritance agreements should be included in the 
Civil Code. In particular, in order to propose a detailed system of inheritance contracts, 
consideration was given to Comparative Law, particularly German, Swiss and Portuguese 
Law, as well as Dutch Law on agreements relating to specific items of property and the 
French proposal of 2005 (now Law in 2006) on the anticipated waiver of the reserve of 
estate; the Autonomous Community civil law systems in Spain were also studied in detail 
for this purpose as good patterns70. 
 
5) It was recommended that heirs’ liability with respect to debts associated with the 
inheritance and the de cuius should be limited and the separation of estate to benefit the 
different creditors should be guaranteed (beneficium separationis). 
 
Other topics were also addressed in the speeches, with some proposals for reforms of regulations 
governing donations mortis causa, preterition, representation rights, and the consequences of 
marital separation for inheritances. No clear agreement was reached in terms of whether a 
proposal should be presented to acknowledge the mandatory rights in mortis causa successions of 
                                                 
69 DELGADO ECHEVERRÍA, “Una propuesta...” [supra, fn. 4], § 10.1, pp. 116-119, 147-149 and 163-164; MARTÍNEZ 
MARTÍNEZ, M., “La reforma de la sucesión intestada en el Código civil” [supra, fn. 27], p. 429 ff., with broad 
grounds on Comparative Law (European countries, Latin-American countries and some others as Japan or 
Quebec). 
 
70 DELGADO ECHEVERRÍA, “Una propuesta...” [supra, fn. 4], § 12.3, pp. 134-136; SÁNCHEZ ARISTI, “Pactos 
sucesorios...” (supra, fn. 58), passim. 
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surviving partners in unmarried couples; although the speech focusing on this issue suggested 
this71, the result of the surveys revealed clear opposition to this idea. 
 
Finally, the conclusions highlighted the need for empirical information (surveys, statistics) to 
formulate and evaluate civil legislation and greater participation of different groups of experts in 
the drafting of laws. The reasons were presented for and against a global reform of Law of 
Succession, as a priority before an overall reform of the Civil Code. 
 
The 9th Congress of Spanish Notaries, held in Barcelona between 12th and 14th May 2005, proposed 
in its conclusions as a first measure (I.1) the following: “to take on legislative reforms that, based 
on the principle of civil liberty, provide mechanisms for legal auto-regulation. For this purpose, it 
is considered very useful to review the rigid aspects of the system of forced shares and to enable the 
development of legal formulae to control the creation, organization and transmission of family 
companies, such as joint wills, inheritance agreements and fiduciary institutions, provided that these 
comply with our public economic order”72. As can be seen, both officially and the individual 
opinions of different notaries mentioned previously, the aim is to increase formal and material 
testamentary freedom by reviewing the system of forced shares.  
 
3.2. Impact of Comparative Law on Spanish legislation and case law on Law of Succession 
 
Although the consideration of Comparative Law in the field of Law of Succession has been the 
focus of clear and detailed attention in Spanish academic doctrine (books and reform proposals), 
this instrument is less evident, at least from the standpoint of public pronouncements, in Spanish 
legislation and case law73. In terms of legislation, some of the latest reforms in the Spanish Civil 
Code have clearly been inspired by the revised regulations incorporated in Autonomous 
Community civil law systems, as it is the case with the Laws of Aragón or Navarre with respect 
to the new article 831 Cc.74. During the debate on Law 13/2005, which allows same-sex marriages 
(accompanied by the corresponding successory rights), the examples of Dutch, Belgian and North 
American Law were presented. In the explanation of motives of Catalan Law 22/2000 on care for 
elderly people, mention is made of the solutions of Comparative Law as a model; despite the 
legislator’s ruling in this regard, this law was mainly inspired by French Law, which does not 
grant succession rights to these figures, unlike Catalan Law75. 
 
Spanish case law on Law of Succession contains few references to Comparative Law or foreign 
legislation (with the exception of legislation governing international successions whenever 
                                                 
71 GETE-ALONSO/YSÀS/NAVAS/SOLÉ, “Sucesión por causa de muerte...” [supra, fn. 20] § 3.3, pp. 345-348 and 392-
397; against, for instance, the general reporter, DELGADO ECHEVERRÍA, op. cit., § 13, pp. 136-138. 
 
73 For a review of judgments in which foreign Law was used as a tool to enhance arguments in contract law 
developed by the Spanish courts, see A. DOMÍNGUEZ LUELMO (2003), “La unificación del Derecho contractual 
europeo por vía jurisprudencial (legal transplants)”, in S. ESPIAU ESPIAU and A. VAQUER ALOY (eds.), Bases de un 
Derecho contractual europeo, Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia, p. 665 ff. 
 
74 See RIVAS MARTÍNEZ, Derecho de succesiones... (supra, fn. 62), II-1, p. 486. 
 
75 GETE-ALONSO/YSÀS/NAVAS/SOLÉ, “Sucesión por causa de muerte...” [supra, fn. 20], § 4.3, pp. 354-356. 
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required by the provisions of International Private Law)76. However, there are some interesting 
cases in which Comparative Law does provide valuable arguments to support the reasoning 
behind the Court decision: the Spanish Supreme Court Judgment of March 6 1945 compared 
Spanish regulations governing partitions inter vivos with article 1076 of the French Civil Code, 
which was imitated on this by other European and American Codes, but not by the Spanish Civil 
Code. In the Supreme Court Judgment of January 22 1963, which aimed to determine whether 
elected beneficiaries should be classified as heirs or legatees, the court referred to the spiritualist 
and subjective criteria of Spanish Law, “without neglecting to value the underlying objective 
criterion in comparative law”. The Supreme Court ruling of June 12 2002, on the tacit revocation 
of a holograph will, compared similar solutions offered by § 2258 of the BGB (German Civil 
Code), and article 739 of the Spanish Civil Code and case law interpreting the mentioned article.  
 
However, the most specific explanation of the value of Comparative Law for the Spanish 
Supreme Court undoubtedly came in its ruling of February 10 1994, which reproduced in detail § 
578 of the Austrian Civil Code and § 2247 of the German BGB to support its arguments in favour 
of softening (something not very common) the formalities on dates stipulated in the Spanish Civil 
Code in connection with a holograph wills executed by a Spanish citizen in conformity with this 
Code. According to this ruling, “these considerations explain, or are based on, the background 
information of the holograph will and on its regulation in modern Codes, based always on the 
fact that the interpretative cooperation of foreign law must be considered with caution and only as a 
subsidiary element, although this does not mean that it is no longer useful in times such as the present, 
when the scope and intensity of the international community has increased the frequency of relations 
between different countries, and it could be argued that participation in the interpretation of national 
regulations by foreign institutions, based, as in this case, on the same Common Law inherited from Roman 
Law, forms part of a sociological hermeneutics admitted in article 3 of the Civil Code under the expression 
of “the social reality of the time in which (the norms) must be applied.” 
 
 
4. Impact of economic integration and possibilities for a European Law of 
Succession 
 
The question of the potential harmonisation of rules on Law of Succession in a specific region 
and, in particular, within the European Union and its incipient European Private Law, has 
received little attention in Spain. Only one study in 2003 actually addressed the problem 
directly77, since most existing analyses of European Private Law in Spain simply exclude, from 
the outset, the possibilities of harmonising Law of Succession given its cultural characteristics 
and the fact that it is somewhat removed from the economic purposes of the internal market. 
Four aspects may be considered in the light of the questions presented for consideration at this 
congress: a) the reasons for and against the harmonisation of Law of Succession in the European 
                                                 
76 For instance, Spanish Supreme Court Judgments of February 11 1952 (Law of France), October 4 1982 (Law of 
France), May 11 1989 (Law of Venezuela), November 18 1994 (Law of France), November 21 1999 (Law of 
England), March 5 2002 (Law of Ghana and England), and October 13 2005 (Law of Italy). 
 
77 CÁMARA LAPUENTE, “¿Derecho europeo de sucesiones? Un apunte” [supra, fn. 7], pp. 1181-1233. 
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Union; b) the question of whether the unification of International Private Law would be 
sufficient; c) the fields more easy and more difficult to harmonise in case of an hypothetical 
unification of substantial Law; d) the creation of a supranational group to draft rules on this 
ambit.  
 
a) The arguments against the European harmonisation of Law of Succession and possible 
counterarguments are as follows78: (i) the lack of competence of the EU and the needs of the 
internal market; in contrast to what may be argued that successions have great economic 
importance in the transfer of property, they are linked to Economic Law (companies, 
insurance, methods of transferring wealth, ownership rights and obligations) and Family Law 
(bottom-up harmonisation is already being studied by the CEFL- Commission on European 
Family Law), and it has already been proposed that estate debts should be treated in 
accordance with the rules governing insolvency proceedings; moreover, lack of competence is 
not an obstacle to the proposal of a model law or base text for an international treaty; (ii) Law 
of Succession is a distinguishing feature based on local traditions with genuine socio-cultural 
characteristics; although the argument is convincing, it is also true this is strongly linked to an 
important common tradition and that many existing rules originate from Roman Law, Canon 
Law and Common Law. Socio-cultural changes are also producing convergence in certain 
values and legal solutions; (iii) the local or regional character of Law of Succession, since it is 
mainly applied at national level, is slightly undermined by the growing frequency of cross-
border problems associated with international successions; (iv) the radical differences between 
Civil Law and Common Law are perhaps less problematic than in other areas of Private Law; 
undoubtedly, both the divided structure of the probate in an administration/liquidation 
phase and another distribution phase through personal representatives does not reflect the 
situation on the continent, while the use of Common Law trusts and the absence of forced 
shares do little to facilitate harmonisation. However, testamentary freedom is not so absolute 
in Common Law because of the “family provisions for dependants”; some countries, such as 
Ireland, recognise a lawful share in favour of the spouse, and English Law of Succession, for 
example, is not governed first and foremost only by case law but rather by various legislative 
texts; (v) not all Law of Succession is non-mandatory; instead, there are numerous mandatory 
legal regulations (formalities, capacity, reserves and forced shares, etc.) which, in the absence 
of harmonization, of a genuine European public order, are being violated or abused using the 
resources of other systems. 
 
b) International Private Law regulations on international successions are currently too problematic 
to be deemed efficient. One of the main problems is the coexistence of unitary and dualist or 
“schismatic” systems. The change in the connecting factor when a person makes a will also 
gives rise to serious conflicts in Law governing succession. For these and other reasons, 
proposals have been presented in Spain for the international unification of norms of conflict of 
                                                 
78 For full arguments, further reasons and references, see CÁMARA LAPUENTE, “¿Derecho europeo de 
sucesiones?...”, ibidem, pp. 1186-1191. This view is shared by GOMÁ LANZÓN, “Los derechos del cónyuge...” [supra, 
fn. 33], p. 933-934. 
 39
InDret 4/2007 Sergio Cámara Lapuente 
Law of Succession79. However, these proposals have not been formulated as incompatible 
with a future process of harmonisation of material regulations, in contrast with the 
suggestions of the “German Notary Institute” in 200480. It is true that Spanish doctrine does 
not suggest proceeding towards this material harmonisation of Law of Succession, but it has 
also stated, with respect to the rules of International Private Law inherent in European Private 
Law, that its harmonisation cannot replace the harmonisation of Material Law regulations but 
rather complement it81. In any case, the harmonisation of International Private Law would not 
solve all the problems, e.g. those arising from national differences regarding whether or not 
heirs should be treated as owners, when and in accordance with which requirements, or the 
problems of qualifying and adapting foreign law82. Apart from that, so far the attempts of 
international conventions on International Private Law in relation to Law of Succession (The 
Hague 1961, 1973 and 1989) have been largely unsuccessful, since they only address a small 
number of less relevant issues, and few are in force or have been ratified.  
 
c) To conclude, the harmonisation of International Private Law regulations on international 
successions is not only positive, given the existing substantive and procedural problems, but 
truly necessary. However, this should not stop us from continuing to examine possibilities for 
future European or international harmonisation of material Law of Succession. To achieve this 
distant objective, there are three different areas in which it may be easier or harder to reach a 
consensus on a uniform solution. Firstly, the scope of the formalities and testamentary 
instruments (wills, inheritance contracts, codicils, etc.), international agreements could be 
reached in this area (see, for example, the Washington Convention of 1973 providing a 
uniform law on the form of international wills or the Basle Convention on the Establishment 
of a Scheme of Registration of Wills of 1972) and priority should be given to the principle of 
maximum freedom, by providing the largest possible number of mechanisms; harmonisation 
is more feasible in this area. Secondly, the existing differences in the technical structure of the 
succession phenomenon make harmonisation very difficult. These differences are evident in 
the systems for transferring ownership, the existence or absence of the forced share and its 
limits, and the order and amount of intestate successions. Thirdly, there are certain historical 
and socio-cultural differences (e.g. the level of legal protection for children or spouses) in which 
globalisation and social changes with converging core values, rights and freedoms may induce 
relative spontaneous convergence. To a certain extent, this is what happened following the 
evolution of Family Law and its impact on succession mortis causa, resulting in equal 
                                                 
79 E. CASTELLANOS RUIZ (2001), Unidad vs. pluralidad legal de la sucesión internacional, Comares, Granada, p. 214. 
Some of the few Spanish responses to the EU Green Paper on Succession Law support the unification of the 
International Private Law in this field, but suggest that some attention should be paid to the diversity of 
succession laws within a country (like Spain) and promote harmonisation in phases and not in a single 
Regulation.  
 
81 S. SÁNCHEZ LORENZO (2002), Derecho privado europeo, Comares, Granada, pp. 330-332 and pp. 203-206. 
 
82 Y. H. LELEU (1998), "Nécessité et moyens d'une harmonization des règles de transmission successorale en 
Europe", European Review of Private Law, 6, p. 168 ff.; CÁMARA LAPUENTE, “¿Derecho europeo de sucesiones? Un 
apunte” [supra, fn. 7], p. 1192. 
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treatment of children, an increase in spouses’ rights, a reduction in the number of relatives 
entitled to forced shares, etc.83
 
d) Some suggestions have been presented for the creation of a European research group to perform 
a broader study of national regulations on European Law and provide specific information on 
comparative law84. However, for now it seems very unlikely that its function should be to 
propose specific rules as a basis for hypothetical harmonisation. Instead, it should initially 
explore real coincidences and differences between national systems, identify converging 
trends and detect areas in which harmonisation proposals may be successful in the future. 
 
 
5. Table of cases 
 
Spanish Supreme Court’s Civil Chamber 
(1939 onwards) 
 
Date Ref. Delivering Opinion 
December 29 1939 RJ 1939\105 - 
May 16 1940 RJ 1940\416bis - 
July 8 1940 RJ 1940\689 - 
March 6 1945 RJ 1945\272 - 
March 23 1948 RJ 1948\303 Celestino Valledor y Suárez-Otero 
November 13 1948 RJ 1948\1270 Celestino Valledor y Suárez-Otero 
March 15 1951 RJ 1951\997 Felipe Gil Casares 
February 11 1952 RJ 1952\284 Celestino Valledor y Suárez-Otero 
October  25 1954 RJ 1954\2862 Juan Serrada Hernández 
June 12 1956 RJ 1956\2482 Obdulio Siboni Cuenca 
November 21 1956 RJ 1956\3830 Juan Serrada Hernández 
January 24 1957 RJ 1957\366 Celestino Valledor y Suárez-Otero 
March 27 1957 RJ 1957\1573 Francisco Eyré Varela 
January 7 1959 RJ 1959\119 Francisco Rodríguez Valcarce 
June 7 1960 RJ 1960\2082 Juan Serrada Hernández 
January 22 1963 RJ 1963\447 Francisco Bonet Ramón 
March 3 1964 RJ 1964\1254 Francisco Bonet Ramón 
March 8 1975 RJ 1975\2600 Federico Rodríguez Solano y Espín 
May 26 1982 RJ 1982\2600 José Beltrán de Heredia y Castaño 
October 4 1982 RJ 1982\5537 Antonio Fernández Rodríguez 
March 26 1983 RJ 1983\1644  Antonio Sánchez Jáuregui 
                                                 
83 For full details, CÁMARA LAPUENTE, “¿Derecho europeo de succesiones? Un apunte” [supra, fn. 7], p. 1230-1232. 
 
84 LELEU, "Nécessité...” [supra, fn. 82], p. 193; D. LEIPOLD (2000), "Europa und das Erbrecht", in, Europas universale 
rechtsordnungspolitische Aufgabe im Recht des dritten Jahrhundert. Festschrift für Alfred Söllner, Beck, München, p. 647 
ff.; C. PAMPLONA CORTE-REAL (2000), "Um Código civil para a Europa. Neccessidade e interesse de uma unificaçâo 
no âmbito do Direito das sucessões", in the Coimbra Congress on a European Civil Code, June (unpublished), p. 
31; CÁMARA LAPUENTE, “¿Derecho europeo de sucesiones? Un apunte” [supra, fn. 7], p. 1232. 
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April 10 1985 -  - 
February 10 1986 RJ 1986\ 513 Matías Malpica González-Elipe 
June 21 1986 RJ 1986\3788  José María Gómez de la Bárcena y López 
February 1 1988 RJ 1988\ 581 Gumersindo Burgos Pérez de Andrade 
March 13 1989 RJ 1989\2036  Mariano Martín-Granizo Fernández 
May 11 1989 RJ 1989\3758  Ramón López Vilas 
May 7 1990 RJ 1990\3687  Francisco Morales Morales 
May 9 1990 RJ 1990\3695  Gumersindo Burgos Pérez de Andrade 
April 25 1991 RJ 1991\ 3029 Eduardo Fernández-Cid de Temes 
December 31 1992 RJ 1992\10426  Gumersindo Burgos Pérez de Andrade 
February 10 1994 RJ 1994\848  Jaime Santos Briz 
June 13 1994 RJ 1994\6507  Eduardo Fernández-Cid de Temes 
July 22 1994 RJ 1994\ 6578 Alfonso Barcalá Trillo-Figueroa 
October 6 1994 RJ 1994\7461  Jaime Santos Briz 
November 18 1994 RJ 1994\8777  Luis Martínez-Calcerrada y Gómez 
January 30 1995 RJ 1995\388  Alfonso Barcalá Trillo-Figueroa 
March 17 1995 RJ 1995\ 1961 José Almagro Nosete 
April 26 1995 RJ 1995\ 3256 Teófilo Ortega Torres 
June 15 1995 RJ 1997\2889  Gumersindo Burgos Pérez de Andrade 
July 24 1995 RJ 1995\ 5603 Gumersindo Burgos Pérez de Andrade 
July 28 1995 RJ 1995\ 6633 Jesús Marina Martínez-Pardo 
November 27 1995 RJ 1995\ 8717 Eduardo Fernández-Cid de Temes 
May 14 1996 RJ 1996\3910 Francisco Morales Morales 
July 25 1996 RJ 1996\5572 Francisco Morales Morales 
November 15 1996 RJ 1996\8212 Jesús Marina Martínez-Pardo 
January 30 1997 RJ 1997\159 Eduardo Fernández-Cid de Temes 
June 16 1997 RJ 1997\5411 Alfonso Barcalá Trillo-Figueroa 
June 22 1997 - - 
October 15 1997 RJ 1997\7614 Luis Martínez-Calcerrada y Gómez 
January 27 1998 RJ 1998\394  José Luis Albácar López 
May 18 1998 RJ 1998\3376 José Almagro Nosete 
February 27 1999 RJ 1999\1418 Pedro González Poveda 
April 29 1999 RJ 1999\2618 Alfonso Barcalá Trillo-Figueroa 
May 21 1999 RJ 1999\ 4580 Pedro González Poveda 
February 15 2000 - - 
May 4 2000 RJ 2000\3385 Antonio Gullón Ballesteros 
December 3 2001 RJ 2001 \9925 Antonio Gullón Ballesteros 
February 12 2002 RJ 2002\3191 Xavier O'Callaghan Muñoz 
March 5 2002 RJ 2002\4085 Antonio Romero Lorenzo 
May 24 2002 RJ 2002\4459 Francisco Marín Castán 
June 12 2002 RJ 2002\8581 Ignacio Sierra Gil de la Cuesta 
September 23 2002 RJ 2002\829 Antonio Gullón Ballesteros 
July 10 2003 RJ 2003\4628 José Manuel Martínez-Pereda Rodríguez 
December 30 2003 RJ 2004\360 Román García Varela 
March 12 2004 RJ 2004\932 Antonio Romero Lorenzo 
March 31 2004 RJ 2004\1717 Alfonso Villagómez Rodil 
March 17 2005 RJ 2005\2389 Ignacio Sierra Gil de la Cuesta 
October 13 2005 RJ 2005\7233 Xavier O'Callaghan Muñoz 
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Annex 1: Succession Rights of Unmarried Couples According to the Autonomous Community Civil Laws in Spain 
 LEGAL CONCEPT SUCCESSION RIGHTS OTHER RIGHTS 
 
  
REQUIREMENTS 
 
CREATION 
 
LEGÍTIMA 
(FORCED 
SHARE) 
 
 
INTESTATE SUCCESSION 
VOLUNTARY SUCCESSION 
(Ways to make one’s will, 
agreements, incl. a 
voluntary universal 
usufruct) 
HOUSEHOLD, 
FURNISHINGS. 
DERECHO DE 
PREDETRACCIÓN 
 
HOUSING 
PENSION OR 
COMPENSATION 
FROM THE 
ESTATE 
ARAGON 
Law 6/1999 
Legal age Constitutive compulsory 
registration in a special 
registry 
No rights  
(≠ spouse) 
No rights  
(≠ spouse) 
= spouse Yes One year, 
free 
 
BALEARIC 
ISLANDS 
Law 18/2001 
Emancipated 
minor 
Constitutive compulsory 
registration in a special 
registry 
= spouse = spouse = spouse Yes Subroga-
tion in 
rentals 
 
 
BASQUE 
COUNTRY 
Law 2/2003 
Emancipated 
minor 
Constitutive compulsory 
registration in a special 
registry 
= spouse 
(vid.  Annex 2 
on the different 
rights in each 
Basque area) 
= spouse 
(vid.  Annex 2 on the different rights in each 
Basque area) 
= spouse 
(vid.  Annex 2 on the 
different rights in each 
Basque area). 
Voluntary universal 
usufruct 
Yes One year  
 
CATALONIA 
Law 10/1998 
Legal age a) Public deed2 or 
b) Two years3 of 
cohabitation or 
c) Cohabitation + common 
children 
a) Homosexual: 
¼ of the estate 
b) 
Heterosexual: 
no rights 
a) Homosexual: 
a.1) ¼ of the estate in case of financial needs 
if there are concurrent descendants and 
ascendants 
a.2) ½ of the estate if there are 2nd degree 
collateral relatives 
a.3) All the estate in absence of the former 
relatives 
b) Heterosexual: no rights 
a) Heterosexual: it is 
possible to grant a 
universal usufruct 
 
b) Homosexual: not 
foreseen 
Yes 
(for all couples) 
One year 
(for all 
couples) 
and 
subroga- 
tion in 
rentals 
Maintenance 
for one year 
(only 
heterosexual 
couples) 
 
GALICIA1 
Law 2/2006 
Emancipated 
minor ? 
Constitutive compulsory 
registration in a special 
registry 
= spouse = spouse = spouse    
 
NAVARRE 
Law 6/2000 
Emancipated 
minor 
a) Public deed, or 
b) One year of 
cohabitation or common 
children or prior deed∫ 
= spouse (legal 
universal 
usufruct) 
= spouse (except in family assets or bienes 
troncales) 
= spouse    
(1) New rights created by the Third Additional Disposition of the Law 2/2006 of 14th June on the Civil Law of Galicia (no further special law on unmarried couples); rules on requisites for creation 
of a stable couple, modified by Law 10/2007, of 28th June.                     
(2) Both for stable homosexual and heterosexual couples.                  
(3) Only for stable heterosexual couples 
(4) Before the Law 10/2007, requisites were (Law 2/2006): a) One year of cohabitation proved by a.1) Registration, or a.2) Public deed, or a.3) Other means b) Cohabitation + common children 
  
Annex 2: Forced Share or Legítima in the Spanish Civil Code and in the Autonomous Community Civil Laws 
 
 
CHILDREN DESCENDANTS ASCENDANTS  WIDOW(ER) SPOUSE *  
    
ALONE 
 
WITH A WIDOW(ER)  
SPOUSE 
ALONE WITH DESCENDANTS WITH ASCENDANTS 
 
SPANISH 
CIVIL CODE 
2/3: legítima larga 
(1/3 legítima estricta + 1/3 
betterment or mejora) 
In absence of children. 
Betterment also in 
detriment of existing 
children 
 
1/2 
 
1/3 
 
2/3 usufruct 
 
1/3 usufruct  
(on the 1/3 of betterment or 
mejora of the children) 
 
1/2 
 
ARAGON 
 
“Collective legítima”: 1/2 for descendants at any level: 
equal, unequal or individual distribution 
 
Nothing 
 
Universal usufruct (mandatory).  
Special effects while alive, from the wedding onwards 
 
 
 
BALEARIC 
ISLANDS 
 
1/3 if they are 4 or less 
½ if they are more than 4 
 
Representation 
 
1/4: only the parents 
in absence of descendents 
Mallorca-Menorca: 
Universal usufruct 
(mandatory) 
Mallorca-Menorca: 1/2  usufruct 
Ibiza-Formentera: nothing in 
case of will; but if intestate 
succession: 1/2  usufruct 
Mallorca-Menorca: 2/3  
usufruct 
Ibiza-Formentera: nothing 
in case of will; but if 
intestate succession: 2/3  
usufruct 
 
BASQUE 
COUNTRY 
 
1. F. Vizcaya: Children and descendants:  
4/5 collective legítima: free distribution 
2. F. Ayala: total testamentary freedom: (all can be 
excluded) 
3. Areas without their own Law (fueros) = Spanish Civil 
Code 
1. F. Vizcaya: 1/2 
2. F. Ayala: freedom 
3. F. Guipúzcoa= Spanish Civil Code 
except for farmhouses 
1. F. Vizcaya: 2/3 usufruct, 
with possible legacy of 
universal usufruct 
(voluntary) 
2. F. Ayala: legal usufruct = 
Civil Code, but 
removable. And 
voluntary universal 
usufruct 
F. Vizcaya: 1/2  usufruct F. Vizcaya: 1/2 usufruct 
CATALONIA 
 
1/4 In absence of children 
(representation) 
1/4: only the parents 
in absence of descendents 
1/4  ownership (only in case of need) 
 
GALICIA 
 
1/4 In absence of children 
(representation) 
 
Nothing 
1/2  usufruct (but a 
voluntary universal usufruct 
is also lawful) 
1/4  usufruct (but a voluntary 
universal usufruct is also lawful) 
1/2  usufruct (but a 
voluntary universal usufruct 
is also lawful) 
 
NAVARRE 
 
Formal legitima; whithout 
patrimonial content 
In absence of children, 
also formal legítima  (limit 
in favour of the children 
of the first marriage) 
 
Nothing 
 
Universal usufruct (mandatory) 
 
(*) The widow spouse is not deemed as a forced heir (legitimario) in Catalonian Law, despite the granting of some similar legal rights. The legal nature of the widow’s legal rights is under discussion within 
the scope of the Civil Code and other Autonomous Communities Civil Laws. 
 
 
